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INTRODUCTION 
In four cases pending in federal courts at the time this Article went to 
press, plaintiffs are claiming that producers of eggs, potatoes, mushrooms or 
milk violated the antitrust laws by agreeing to produce less.  For example, a 
class of plaintiffs has alleged that members of an egg producers’ cooperative 
raised the price that consumers pay for eggs by limiting the number of hens 
per cage, under a pretext of promoting animal welfare.1  Another class of 
plaintiffs has alleged that a dairy cooperative paid certain producers to “re-
tire” or slaughter their entire dairy herd and refrain from re-entering the busi-
ness for a year.2  In a lawsuit against potato growers, potato purchasers have 
alleged that the growers’ cooperative raised potato prices when it paid farm-
ers to limit the number of acres they plant.3  A fourth lawsuit alleges that a 
mushroom growers’ cooperative bought out competing mushroom farms and 
sold the land with restrictive covenants that prohibited mushroom production 
on the property. 4 
The defendants in these lawsuits have sought shelter from the antitrust 
laws based on the Capper-Volstead Act, which allows agricultural producers 
to “act together” in “collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, 
and marketing” their products in interstate and foreign commerce.5  The de-
fendants have claimed that Capper-Volstead allows them to engage in collec-
tive actions to limit production and therefore increase prices.6  The plaintiffs 
argue that Capper-Volstead’s exemption does not extend to agreements to 
limit production.7 
No court has yet ruled on the defendants’ claims that their production-
limiting agreements are exempt under Capper-Volstead.  In the case against 
potato growers, the district court stated that, in its view, the exemption does 
 
 1. Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 10-18, In re 
Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-02002, 2014 WL 6388436 (E.D Pa. 
Nov. 17, 2014) (No. 08-md-02002) [hereinafter In re Eggs Third Consolidated 
Amended Class Action Complaint]. 
 2. Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 4, Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, 
No. C 11-04766 JSW, 2014 WL 4643639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014). 
 3. First Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 2, In re Fresh & Process Pota-
toes Antitrust Litig., No. 4:10-MD-2186-BLW, 2014 WL 1847433 (D. Idaho May 8, 
2014) (No. 4:10-MD-2186-BLW) [hereinafter In re Potatoes First Amended Class 
Action Complaint]. 
 4. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 7, In re Mush-
room Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 06-0620, 2014 WL 5149082 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 14, 2014) (No. 06-0620) [hereinafter In re Mushrooms Revised Consolidated 
Amended Class Action Complaint]. 
 5. Capper-Volstead Act, ch. 57, 42 Stat. 388 (1922) (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (2012)). 
 6. See, e.g., In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 
1141, 1150 (D. Idaho 2011). 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 1154. 
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not shield the agreement at issue in that case, but the court’s ruling rested on 
other grounds. 8  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Federal Trade Commis-
sion (“FTC”) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) have made 
statements suggesting a narrow reading of the Act but have not taken action 
or issued binding decisions on the question.9 
The debate over output-limitation agreements and the scope of Capper-
Volstead has important implications for agricultural markets.  The plaintiffs 
in the pending cases have alleged substantial consumer price increases over 
the period of the activities alleged in the complaint.10  For example, the com-
plaint against potato producers alleges that fresh potato prices increased by 
nearly fifty percent during the period of the agreement.11  The egg products 
complaint alleges that egg prices were declared by the cooperative to be at 
“record levels” within four years of the production restrictions.12  Agricultural 
producers, on the other hand, have hailed the measures for eliminating the 
boom-and-bust cycle in agricultural markets.13 
In some cases, cooperatives may lose Capper-Volstead protection for 
violating other provisions of the Act.  For example, the Act limits protection 
to cooperatives composed entirely of producers,14 and courts have held that 
the presence of non-producers in the cooperative disqualifies the cooperative 
from the protections of Capper-Volstead.15  In both the potatoes and the 
 
 8. See id. at 1154-57.  The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based 
on the existence of disputed facts as to whether the cooperative in that case included 
members not eligible for Capper-Volstead protection.  See id. at 1154.  Thus, while 
the Capper-Volstead issue remains before the court on factual issues relating to coop-
erative membership, defendants have been placed on notice that the court will not 
uphold a claim for Capper-Volstead immunity for an output limiting agreement, even 
if its membership does not automatically disqualify the cooperative from Capper-
Volstead protection. 
 9. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., In re Eggs Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, 
supra note 1, at ¶ 358; In re Potatoes First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra 
note 3, at ¶ 234. 
 11. In re Potatoes First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶ 
234. 
 12. In re Eggs Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 
1, at ¶ 358. 
 13. See, e.g., John Miller, Grocers Sue Spud Growers Over Alleged Price Fixing, 
SEATTLE TIMES (June 14, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/202
1184846_potatopricefixxml.html. 
 14. The Act’s exemption applies to “[p]ersons engaged in the production of 
agricultural products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers . . 
. .”  7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012);  see also Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. 
(Sunkist II), 389 U.S. 384, 392 (1967) (discussing the legislative history of the mem-
bership requirement). 
 15. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 822-23, 828-
29 (1978) (holding that the presence of even one non-farmer in cooperative disquali-
fies it from Capper-Volstead protection); Sunkist II, 389 U.S. at 387-88, 403 (holding 
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mushrooms litigations, the district courts have held that the cooperatives vio-
lated the producers-only rule and therefore lost Capper-Volstead protection.16  
The Act also requires that the association be “operated for the mutual benefit 
of the members thereof”; that “no member of the association is allowed more 
than one vote”; that the association pay no “dividends on stock or member-
ship capital in excess of [eight] percent per annum”; and that the cooperative 
“shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to an amount greater in value 
than such as are handled by it for members.”17 
Carefully-managed cooperative associations, however, may ensure that 
all of these threshold requirements are met.  The question then remains, what 
conduct is within the Act’s exemption from antitrust scrutiny?  Case law has 
made clear that the “marketing” exemption extends to some post-production 
supply control methods intended to stabilize prices, such as a temporary 
agreement to withhold product from the market;18 a lawsuit by a cooperative 
to prevent its members from selling outside the cooperative marketing 
agreement;19 and option agreements by a cooperative to purchase excess sup-
ply from its members.20  What remains unclear is whether agricultural coop-
eratives may also agree to control supply by limiting the amount their mem-
bers may produce in the first place. 
This Article concludes that agreements by a cooperative to limit the 
production of an agricultural commodity do not qualify for Capper-Volstead 
protection.  None of the standard sources of statutory interpretation – the 
plain language of the statute, direct statements of congressional intent, or 
evidence of the purpose of the legislation – suggest that Congress intended to 
permit farmers to raise prices by agreeing to produce less.  The textual excep-
tion for “marketing,” while susceptible to multiple interpretations, does not 
easily extend to agreements not to produce.  This interpretation is strength-
ened when the statute is read as a whole, including the prohibition in Section 
2 on conduct by cooperatives that unduly enhances consumer prices.  And 
 
that a cooperative whose membership included 15% non-farmer packing houses was 
disqualified from Capper-Volstead protection); Ripplemeyer v. Nat’l Grape Coop. 
Ass’n, 807 F. Supp. 1439, 1457 (N.D. Ark. 1992) (denying Capper-Volstead protec-
tion to national grape cooperative whose members were contracted to sell grapes to 
wholly-owned processor subsidiary of cooperative).  But see Alexander v. Nat’l 
Farms Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1186-87 (8th Cir. 1982) (granting Capper-Volstead pro-
tection to cooperative that inadvertently received membership donations from small 
number of non-farmers outside dairy industry), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983). 
 16. See In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 
1151-54 (D. Idaho 2011); In re Mushrooms Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. 
Supp. 2d 274, 284 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 17. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012). 
 18. See Alexander, 687 F.2d at 1188. 
 19. See Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen Cnty. Coop., Beet Growers Ass’n, 725 
F.2d 564, 569 (1984). 
 20. See Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608 (M.D. Ga. 
1981), aff’d, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983). 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/7
2015] COST OF CUTTING AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT 455 
while the floor debates are ambiguous as to whether Congress contemplated 
pre-production supply controls, the legislative history makes clear that Con-
gress’s purpose in enacting the exemption was to eliminate the monopsony 
power wielded by intermediary purchasers of agricultural products, while 
simultaneously protecting consumers from higher food prices.  Today, the 
substantial market power enjoyed by large agricultural cooperatives has suc-
cessfully eliminated the problem of predatory “middlemen” in those markets.  
Allowing cooperatives to enter into agreements with members to limit pro-
duction can only raise farm prices by charging consumers more, in contraven-
tion of the Act’s clear purpose to protect consumers. 
In Part I, this Article reviews the allegations of production-limiting 
agreements by cooperatives in the eggs, potatoes, mushrooms, and milk mar-
kets.  Since the purpose of this Article is to offer a close reading of the Cap-
per-Volstead Act, the Act is laid out in Part II.  In Part III, an interpretation 
based on a textualist reading, supplemented by canons of statutory construc-
tion, point to the conclusion that Capper-Volstead does not extend to pre-
production agreements to limit supply.  Part IV canvasses the (slender) com-
mittee reports and (extensive) floor debates, which set forth scant discussion 
and conflicting statements on the question of production controls.  Finally, 
Part V reviews federal farm policy on supply controls to support the conclu-
sion that Congress did not intend the Act to permit private economic actors to 
raise consumer prices by limiting production. 
Just because conduct is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the 
Capper-Volstead Act does not necessarily mean it will violate antitrust laws.  
Such allegations would have to be proven like any other antitrust claim, and 
the courts may apply a rule of reason analysis that tends to shield such actions 
from liability.  Further research is necessary to consider the likely fate of 
production-limiting agreements in light of federal court interpretations of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.21  Losing the Capper-Volstead exemption by 
 
 21. To prevail on an antitrust claim, plaintiffs in the pending supply limitation 
suits would have to prove that the defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
which prohibits agreements among competitors in restraint of trade.  15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2012).  As a general rule, the Supreme Court has long held that agreements between 
competitors that place limitations on output constitute per se violations of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.  See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 
608 (1972) (territory-allocation agreement by cooperative buying association for 
supermarkets); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 397-98, 435 
(1945) (licensing agreements by owners of glass-making patents that limited amount 
of production by licensees or refused licenses to limit overall supply); United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 185-90 (1940) (coordinated program to buy 
surpluses of oil to avoid “disturbing influence” on prices).  However, courts have 
made exceptions to the rule that supply controls are per se illegal where the industries 
at issue have special characteristics that justify the defendants’ conduct.  See, e.g., 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-
01 (1984) (output limitation on college football broadcasts); United States v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 156-57 (D.D.C. 1982) (output limitation on 
amount of commercial material broadcast per hour and number of commercial inter-
5
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itself would, however, impose real costs on cooperatives, which would either 
have to avoid such conduct or factor in the cost of defending Sherman Act 
claims.  Loss of the exemption would offer consumers potential benefits 
against supracompetitive prices, since output limitation measures by coopera-
tives would be subject to antitrust scrutiny and may be held to violate anti-
trust laws. 
I.  OUTPUT-LIMITING AGREEMENTS IN THE COURTS 
In the cases pending before federal courts, plaintiffs point to a variety of 
programs by defendant cooperatives that have the goal of reducing the overall 
supply of the relevant agricultural commodity.  In most of these cases, de-
fendants do not deny the thrust of the allegations: that members of the coop-
erative agreed to a program of coordinated action that had the purpose and 
effect of reducing supply and raising prices.  Instead, defendants claim that 
their conduct is protected by the Capper-Volstead exemption.  The types of 
agreements vary based on the commodity produced and involve different 
levels of coordinated action at the member and the cooperative levels. 
A.  Eggs: Reducing the Number of Laying Hens 
In the eggs litigation, the actions involve claims by both direct and indi-
rect purchasers of shell eggs and processed egg products.22  The defendants 
include individual egg and egg products producers and industry associations, 
United Egg Producers, Inc. (“UEP”) and United States Egg Marketers, Inc. 
(“USEM”).23 
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants entered into a series of illegal 
agreements to raise the price of eggs by reducing the number of total laying 
hens in production.24  The complaints allege that defendants, beginning in 
1999, agreed to coordinated rates of flock molting (removing older hens from 
production), flock inventory and hatch reduction, and the reduction of egg 
 
ruptions).  If a court were to find special conditions in agricultural markets that justify 
output limitations, plaintiffs would have to show that the defendants’ conduct violated 
the Rule of Reason, under which courts analyze the effects of the challenged restraint 
on competitive conditions in the market.  See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Eng’rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
 22. See In re Eggs Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra 
note 1 (pertaining to direct purchaser actions); Fifth Amended Consolidated Class 
Action Complaint, In re Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-MD-02002, 2014 WL 
6388436 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2014) (No. 08-MD-02002) [hereinafter In re Eggs Fifth 
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint] (pertaining to indirect purchaser 
actions). 
 23. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 867, 875, 877 
(E.D. Pa. 2012). 
 24. See In re Eggs Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra 
note 1, at ¶¶ 10-18. 
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supply.25  The complaints also contend that the defendants agreed to adopt 
pretextual animal husbandry guidelines that required members to reduce the 
number of hens per cage and not to add additional cages to make up for the 
shortfall.26  Finally, plaintiffs claim that defendants agreed to export excess 
supply at a loss and compensate each other for those losses in order to take 
advantage of higher prices in the domestic market.27 
The complaints cite statements by defendants and industry publications 
that evidence an industry-wide agreement to limit supply of eggs through 
these programs.  For instance, the plaintiffs allege that, in 1999, a UEP news-
letter posed questions to producers: “Will the industry participate in a pro-
gram to bring supply more closely in line with demand over the next 12 
months? . . . You will also be asked if you would participate in a supply ad-
justment program.”28  The complaint alleges that UEP’s members subse-
quently voted to adopt measures reducing the number of hens in production.29 
In 2000, according to the complaints, UEP members adopted guidelines 
regarding the amount of cage space required for each hen, recommending that 
producers transition from forty-eight square inches per hen to sixty-seven to 
eighty-six square inches per hen.30  After adopting these guidelines, in April 
2002, the president of UEP gave a presentation at an industry conference 
entitled, “Cage Enhanced Production and its Affects [sic] on Selling Price, 
Production Costs and Consumption.”31  The plaintiffs contend that, at the 
October 2002 annual board meeting of UEP, the defendants adopted a rule 
requiring that 100 percent of a producer’s egg houses follow the cage space 
requirements.32  In an internal UEP memo, the complaint alleges, UEP ex-
plained that the rule was necessary because “[m]any producers said they 
would only commit to the program if 100% of facilities were required.”33  
The complaint cites an August 2003 editorial by a UEP representative stating 
that the cage space requirements were adopted by 200 companies owning 
more than eighty-two percent of the total laying hens in production national-
ly.34 
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants took steps to enforce the cage 
space requirements.  The complaint states that UEP’s July 2003 newsletter 
included an article entitled “Word of Caution,” which stated, “As producers 
continue to reduce their layer house capacity to meet the UEP Animal Hus-
bandry Guidelines, please don’t make the mistake of building new facilities 
 
 25. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13, 15. 
 26. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 17, 194-241, 414-26. 
 27. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 320-57. 
 28. Id. at ¶ 177. 
 29. Id. at ¶ 179. 
 30. Id. at ¶ 197. 
 31. In re Eggs Fifth Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 
22, at ¶ 179 (pertaining to indirect purchaser actions). 
 32. Id. at ¶ 185. 
 33. Id. at ¶ 186. 
 34. Id. at ¶ 196. 
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to replace the lost number of birds.”35  The direct purchaser plaintiffs allege 
that UEP contacted customers of members who withdrew from the UEP cage 
space certification program and urged them not to purchase eggs from those 
members.36  In UEP’s May 2004 newsletter, a UEP representative wrote, 
“[T]he Animal Care Certified program is the only roadmap the industry has 
ever had for future planning.  If you stay true to the program and manage it to 
meet the market demand, it can provide the industry with prolonged prof-
its.”37 
Although UEP initially indicated that its cage-space guidelines were 
motivated by concerns for animal welfare, the complaint alleges that this 
explanation was pretextual.38  UEP hired a “scientific advisory committee” to 
review data and make recommendations, but the UEP member egg producers 
drafted the guidelines and did not release the scientific advisors’ recommen-
dations.39  The complaint quoted a presentation in which two members of the 
scientific advisory committee stated that the committee would have made 
different recommendations if it could have considered additional studies, 
“since these indicate that hens need and want more space than 72 sq. in.”40  
The FTC investigated UEP’s use of the “Animal Care Certified” label as po-
tentially misleading to consumers, and on September 30, 2005, announced an 
agreement that UEP would no longer use the logo.41 
As of June 2014, settlements had been preliminarily or finally approved 
between the direct purchaser plaintiffs and several defendants, while litigation 
continued on other claims.42 
 
 35. Id. at ¶ 194; In re Eggs Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Com-
plaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 247. 
 36. In re Eggs Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 
1, at ¶¶ 226-41. 
 37. Id. at ¶ 267 (alteration in original). 
 38. Id. at ¶¶ 414-26. 
 39. Id. at ¶¶ 415-18. 
 40. Id. at ¶ 419. 
 41. See Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Federal Trade Commission, to 
Al Pope, President & Chief Exec. Officer, United Egg Producers (Sept. 30, 2005), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/united-
egg-producers-uep/uepstaffopinionletter.pdf.  In the agreement, UEP agreed to re-
place the “Animal Care Certified” logo with a logo that read, “United Egg Producers 
Certified.™ Produced in Compliance with the United Egg Producers Animal Hus-
bandry Guidelines. www.uepcertified.com.”  Id.  The FTC decided not to recommend 
enforcement action, but indicated its intention to continue monitoring UEP’s use and 
advertising of the seal.  Id. 
 42. See Order, In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-02002 
(E.D. Pa. July 30, 2014) (No. 08-md-02002) (granting preliminary approval of settle-
ment between direct purchaser plaintiffs and defendants National Food Corporation, 
Midwest Poultry Services, LP, United Egg Producers, and United States Egg Market-
ers, and of second amendment to settlement agreement with Sparboe Farms); Order, 
In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-02002, 2014 WL 828083 
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B.  Potatoes: Buying Out Growers 
In the potatoes litigation, plaintiffs allege that defendants implemented 
policies that reduced the potato supply.  In addition to post-production supply 
management techniques,43 the complaint claims that the potato cooperative 
began an acreage-reduction program in Idaho44 and later expanded that pro-
gram throughout the United States45 and Canada.46  The complaint contends 
that the first acreage reduction program was implemented in Idaho in 2005 
and reduced the potato crop by approximately fifteen percent, or 26,000 
acres.47  Under the program, potato growers bid on the price they would re-
quire to be paid to reduce acreage, and the cooperative accepted the lowest 
bids.48  According to the complaint, the national acreage reduction program in 
2005 reduced potato acres to their lowest level since 1959, down approxi-
mately 35,000 acres,49 for an average potato price increase of twenty-three 
percent over 2004 prices.50  Growers purportedly completed a “Planting In-
tention Form” at the beginning of the season, which the cooperative checked 
against actual plantings and documentation submitted to the USDA’s Farm 
Service Agency to verify that growers complied with their pledged reduc-
tions.51  Growers that violated the restrictions were subject to fines of $100 
per acre.52 
In 2006, the national cooperative announced a plan to reduce potato 
plantings by ten percent.53  Non-complying members were required to pay an 
assessment of fifty dollars per acre, and members agreeing to reduce plant-
ings by more than ten percent were eligible for the bid buy-down program.54  
In a 2006 presentation to members of the national cooperative, one producer-
officer stated, “Cooperative growers must create orderly markets and grow 
the category . . . instead of fighting for a piece of it by zero-sum competi-
 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2014) (No. 08-md-02002) (granting preliminary approval of set-
tlement between direct purchaser plaintiffs and defendant Cal-Maine Foods, Inc.). 
 43. Other supply control methods included coordinating potato shipments and 
donating potatoes to charity; price floors below which members agreed not to ship 
potatoes; and “shipping holidays” during which members would shut down shipments 
for eight hours.  Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 138-40, Simon v. United Potato Grow-
ers of Idaho, Inc., No. 4:10-cv-00520 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2010) (No. 4:10-cv-00520). 
 44. Id. at ¶¶ 141-42. 
 45. Id. at ¶¶ 145-53. 
 46. Id. at ¶ 154. 
 47. Id. at ¶ 142. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at ¶ 155. 
 50. Id. at ¶ 156. 
 51. Id. at ¶¶ 170-71. 
 52. Id. at ¶ 174. 
 53. Id. at ¶ 159. 
 54. Id. 
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tion!”55  The complaint alleges that the potato acreage reduction program was 
monitored through the use of field audits, GPS, aerial photography, and satel-
lite imaging.56 
The programs were continued in 2007 and 2008 and were even extended 
to interested non-members.57  In 2008, potato growers nationally planted 
80,000 fewer acres than in 2007.58  The complaint cites data from the Idaho 
Potato Commission that, by the summer of 2008, a ten-pound bag of potatoes 
cost consumers fifteen dollars, more than a six-dollar increase from 2007.59  
Another study cited in the complaint found that national monthly fresh potato 
prices increased during the supply control period from seven dollars per hun-
dredweight to $10.19 per hundredweight.60  As of the time the complaint was 
filed in 2010, the acreage reduction program was continuing.61 
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on Capper-
Volstead grounds because the plaintiffs’ complaint involved allegations that 
the defendants conspired with entities excluded from Capper-Volstead pro-
tection, including non-members and non-producers.62  The court held that 
these allegations presented questions of fact that could not be resolved on a 
motion to dismiss.63 
The court’s opinion denying defendants’ motion to dismiss also ad-
dressed the scope of the Capper-Volstead exemption as applied to produc-
tion-limiting agreements.  The court noted that this portion of its opinion was 
not necessary to its decision, and that its decision to give an “advisory opin-
ion” on the issue was an “extraordinary step” justified by the full briefing by 
the parties, the scant case law on the issue, and the desire for a “just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination” of actions.64  The court agreed with plaintiffs 
that “the Capper-Volstead Act excludes acreage reductions, production re-
strictions, or collusive crop planning.”65  The court interpreted the plain 
meaning of the statute’s exemption of certain activities and held that the ex-
emption did not encompass activities that occur prior to planting.66  The court 
distinguished the cases relied on by defendants67 and noted that both the DOJ 
 
 55. Id. at ¶ 162. 
 56. Id. at ¶ 169. 
 57. Id. at ¶¶ 178-79. 
 58. Id. at ¶ 183. 
 59. Id. at ¶ 184. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at ¶¶ 191-92. 
 62. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1154 
(D. Idaho 2011). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1152 n.5 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 65. Id. at 1154. 
 66. Id. at 1154-55. 
 67. Id. at 1155-56 (distinguishing Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen Cnty. Coop. Beet 
Growers Ass’n, 725 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984) (involving post-production supply 
controls); Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); N. 
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and the FTC had expressed similar opinions.68  The court also noted that “in-
dividual freedom to produce more in times of high prices is a quintessential 
safeguard against Capper-Volstead abuse, which Congress recognized in en-
acting the statute.”69 
C.  Dairy Cows: Herd Retirements 
In Edwards v. National Milk Producers Federation,70 plaintiffs allege 
that defendant dairy producers paid into a program by defendant National 
Milk Producers Federation (“NMPF”) to “strengthen and stabilize” raw farm 
milk prices.71  The complaint states that defendant NMPF required member 
producers to pay into a program called Cooperatives Working Together 
(“CWT”), which then paid selected producers to prematurely “retire” (or 
slaughter) their dairy herds:72  “These herd retirements required participating 
dairy farmers to destroy all of the dairy cows in all of their herds and, begin-
ning on April 1, 2009, agree not to reenter the dairy farming business for at 
least one year.”73 
According to the complaint, CWT stated that substantial industry partic-
ipation – at least sixty-seven percent – was required to fund the necessary 
herd buy-outs, a level that was achieved in 2009.74  A CWT officer was quot-
ed in the complaint as saying that CWT had received information that “most 
producers view the decision to sell their herds through CWT as a long-term 
commitment which results in them exiting the business permanently.”75  Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, CWT expressed to its members that, “[i]n further-
ance of ‘the program’s goals for eliminating milk production,’ . . . eligibility 
 
Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413 F. Supp. 984 
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (concluding that although cooperative exchanged information about 
planting, primary activity was to set price ranges); In the Matter of Wash. Crab Ass’n 
et al., 66 F.T.C. 45 (1964) (finding that the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act at 
issue in the case contained different language than Capper-Volstead)). 
 68. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 n.9, 
1156-57 (citing A REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE TASK GROUP 
ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES (1977); In the Matter of Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers 
Coop., 90 F.T.C. 18 (1977)). 
 69. Id. at 1156.  At the time this Article went to print, the parties were discussing 
settlement.  See In re Potatoes, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, Docket Entry Notice of Hear-
ing (Apr. 29, 2015) (setting status conference for discussion of process and deadlines 
for motion for class certification and proposed settlement and notice of proposed 
settlement process to class). 
 70. No. C 11-04766 JSW, 2014 WL 4643639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014). 
 71. Class Action Complaint at ¶ 4, Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. 
C 11-04766 JSW, 2014 WL 4643639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014). 
 72. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. 
 73. Edwards, 2014 WL 4643639, at *1 (quoting Second Amended Consolidated 
Class Action Complaint). 
 74. Class Action Complaint, supra note 71, ¶ 71. 
 75. Id. at ¶ 44. 
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was limited to ‘a commercial dairy herd and . . . not cows that have been seg-
regated . . . due to lower production.”76 
The complaint alleges that the herd reduction program had a substantial 
impact on raw farm milk supply and milk prices.  Plaintiffs cite an economic 
analysis produced for CWT which found that, from 2003-2010, the cumula-
tive impact of the herd retirement program was to increase raw farm milk 
prices by more than nine billion dollars,77 an effect tracked by the retail milk 
price.78  Plaintiffs contend that the program led to the removal of more than 
500,000 cows from production and reduction of the nation’s milk supply by 
approximately ten billion pounds.79 
The defendants in Edwards moved to dismiss on Capper-Volstead 
grounds, arguing that Section 2 of the Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture 
exclusive or primary jurisdiction over antitrust claims against agricultural 
cooperatives.80  In denying the motion, the court noted that the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected the proposition in a 1939 case, United States v. Bor-
den.81 
D.  Mushrooms: Land Retirement with Restrictive Covenants 
In the mushrooms case, plaintiffs have alleged that a mushroom-
growers’ cooperative violated antitrust laws by eliminating competition from 
growers who were not cooperative members in order to control supply.  The 
complaint alleges that the cooperative collected six million dollars in mem-
bership dues and a “Supply Control Assessment” and used three million dol-
lars of those funds to purchase four competing mushroom farms and acquire 
lease options on two additional farms.82 
For example, the complaint claims that the cooperative outbid a pro-
spective mushroom grower to purchase a farm at auction in Dublin, Georgia 
that had an annual production capacity of approximately eight million pounds 
of mushrooms.83  According to the allegations in the complaint, the coopera-
tive entered into a land exchange three months later for another mushroom 
farm in Evansville, Pennsylvania, and in the transaction placed a permanent 
deed restriction on the Dublin farm prohibiting any business related to mush-
room production.84  The cooperative is alleged to have lost $525,000 in the 
 
 76. Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at ¶ 8, Edwards, 
2014 WL 4643639 (No. C 11-04766 JSW) (emphasis in original). 
 77. Id. at ¶¶ 108-13. 
 78. Id. at ¶112-14, 119. 
 79. Id. at ¶ 1. 
 80. See Order Regarding Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint, 
Edwards, 2014 WL 4643639 (No. C 11-04766 JSW). 
 81. Id. at 4 (citing United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 204-06 (1939)). 
 82. In re Mushrooms Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, 
supra note 4, at ¶ 72. 
 83. Id. at ¶¶ 73-74. 
 84. Id. 
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transactions.85  The complaint further contends that the cooperative then sold 
the two parcels in the Evansville farm with similar deed restrictions at a col-
lective loss of $137,000.86  The complaint alleges several other land transac-
tions resulting in similar deed restrictions against growing mushrooms.87  
According to the complaint, these transactions eliminated at least fifty million 
pounds of mushroom supply.88  Plaintiffs also allege other anti-competitive 
conduct aimed at coercing non-member growers to join the cooperative or 
refrain from selling mushrooms at prices below the price set by the coopera-
tive.89 
The DOJ filed a complaint against the cooperative in 2004.90  The Final 
Judgment agreed upon by DOJ and the cooperative required the cooperative 
to eliminate all of the deed restrictions.91  Plaintiffs in In re Mushrooms seek 
to recover for damages resulting from unlawful price increases of at least 
eight percent resulting from the cooperative’s actions.92 
In 2009, the district court in In re Mushrooms held that the mushroom 
cooperative was not entitled to Capper-Volstead protection because the coop-
erative included at least one non-grower member.93  As a result, the court did 
not reach the question of whether Capper-Volstead exempts supply control 
activities like those allegedly undertaken by the cooperative. 
II.  THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD ACT 
The Capper-Volstead Act was passed in 1922.  Nearly a century later, 
agricultural producers and their customers dispute whether the Act exempts 
agreements by agricultural producers to limit the overall production of partic-
ular agricultural commodities.  The Act is short, comprising only two sec-
tions.  It is codified in the Agriculture title of the U.S. Code (Title 7), rather 
than in the Commerce and Trade title (Title 15) like key antitrust statutes 
such as the Sherman Act,94 the Clayton Act,95 and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.96  Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act is the focus of the pend-
ing lawsuits because of its exemption of certain coordinated conduct by agri-
cultural producers.  Section 1, reproduced in full, states: 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at ¶ 74. 
 87. See id. at ¶¶ 75-79. 
 88. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 89. Id. at ¶¶ 4-8. 
 90. See id. at ¶ 85. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 66, 79. 
 93. See In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 274, 
284 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012). 
 95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2012) (Labor Title). 
 96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012). 
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Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers, 
planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in 
associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in 
collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing 
in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so en-
gaged.  Such associations may have marketing agencies in common; 
and such associations and their members may make the necessary con-
tracts and agreements to effect such purposes: Provided, however, 
That such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of the 
members thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the 
following requirements: 
First.  That no member of the association is allowed more than one 
vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may 
own therein, or, 
Second.  That the association does not pay dividends on stock or 
membership capital in excess of 8 per centum per annum. 
And in any case to the following: 
Third.  That the association shall not deal in the products of nonmem-
bers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for 
members.97 
While the defendants in the pending lawsuits have relied on Section 1, it 
is worth noting that Section 2 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to en-
force a broad range of antitrust violations by “such associations,” that is, 
those described in Section 1.  Section 2 provides: 
If the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that any 
such association monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign 
commerce to such an extent that the price of any agricultural product 
is unduly enhanced by reason thereof, he shall serve upon such associ-
ation a complaint stating his charge in that respect, to which complaint 
shall be attached, or contained therein, a notice of hearing, specifying 
a day and place not less than thirty days after the service thereof, re-
quiring the association to show cause why an order should not be 
made directing it to cease and desist from monopolization or restraint 
of trade.98 
If the Secretary finds after a hearing “that such association monopolizes 
or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce to such an extent that the 
price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced thereby,” he may issue 
an order “directing such association to cease and desist from monopolization 
 
 97. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012). 
 98. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (2012). 
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or restraint of trade.”  The association may appeal the order to the district 
court where it is organized, and the Secretary may seek enforcement of the 
order in such court if the association fails to comply.99  Either party may pre-
sent additional evidence in the district court, and the DOJ is charged with 
enforcing the order.100  The court may issue a temporary injunction while the 
appeal is pending and a permanent injunction “or other appropriate remedy” 
upon conclusion.101 
III.  THE TEXTUALIST READING: DEFINING “MARKETING” 
The Capper-Volstead Act provides an exemption to agricultural produc-
ers for “collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and market-
ing” their products.102  The defendants in the Potatoes lawsuit have argued 
that agreements to restrict production fall within the definitions of these activ-
ities expressly protected by the Act.103  The U.S. Supreme Court, the defend-
ants argue, has held that the Act protects the right to engage in price-fixing104 
and by extension, it must also include other methods of stabilizing prices, 
such as controlling supply.105 
The Supreme Court has held that statutory construction must begin with 
the language used by Congress, and courts must assume that the legislature 
intended the words of the statute to have their ordinary meaning.106  From 
that point on, though, views on the proper sources of statutory interpretation 
diverge, with some judges looking to legislative history to provide clues as to 
the meaning or purpose of the statutory language,107 while other judges spurn 
such practices, preferring to rely on textual sources like dictionaries and con-
textual clues.108 
If the plain meaning of the Act clearly includes or excludes output re-
strictions, no review of legislative history is necessary.  If the Act is ambigu-
ous, on the other hand, a resort to legislative history may serve several func-
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. § 291. 
 103. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Based on the Capper-
Volstead Act and Related Statutes at 14-16, In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust 
Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Idaho 2011) (No. 4:10-MD-2186-BLW) [hereinafter 
In re Potatoes Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss]. 
 104. Id. at 14 (quoting Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 
362 U.S. 458, 466 (1960)). 
 105. Id. at 15-16. 
 106. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1165 (2014); Sandifer v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014). 
 107. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 863 (1992). 
 108. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 36-41 (1997). 
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tions.  First, it may shed light on the meaning of the language used by Con-
gress and whether that language intentionally includes restrictions on produc-
tion.  Second, it may provide indirect evidence of congressional intent to in-
clude or exclude output restrictions from the protections offered by the Act.  
Third, it may offer insight into the purpose of the Act and whether exemption 
of output restrictions furthers that purpose.  Before any resort to legislative 
history, then, it is necessary to consider whether the term “marketing” can 
plainly be held to include or exclude production controls. 
A.  Ordinary Meaning 
A textualist reading of the Act requires a court to hold that one or more 
of the terms identified by the statute – “processing,” “preparing for market,” 
“handling,” and “marketing” – encompasses output restrictions.  The task of 
the courts, then, is to interpret the Act to determine whether those terms, in-
dividually or together, include agreements to restrict production.109  A court 
reading the text need not find reasons for the legislature’s choice, but merely 
give effect to that choice as plainly expressed.110  Courts will assume that the 
ordinary meaning of the language accurately represents the legislative pur-
pose of Congress.111  To shed light on the ordinary meaning of statutes, courts 
may consult common dictionary definitions of the words used by the legisla-
ture.112 
Analyzing the words individually, the production-restricting agreements 
engaged in by the defendants appear to fall more closely within the meaning 
of the term “marketing” than any of the terms that precede it (“processing,” 
“preparing for market,” or “handling”).  In Treasure Valley Potato Bargain-
ing Association v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.,113 the Ninth Circuit relied on a defini-
tion from Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, which defined “marketing” 
as “[t]he aggregate of functions involved in transferring title and in moving 
goods from producer to consumer, including among other things buying, sell-
ing, storing, transporting, standardizing, financing, risk bearing, and supply-
 
 109. The court’s advisory opinion in In re Potatoes was based on its reading of 
the term “marketing.”  In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 
2d 1141, 1171-72 (D. Idaho 2011). 
 110. See Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217-18 
(2002). 
 111. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985). 
 112. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 388 (2009); Smith v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Pub. L. 
No. 106-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); 
Hernandez-Miranda v. Empresas Diaz Masso, Inc., 651 F.3d 167, 171-72 (1st Cir. 
2011); Transwestern Pipeline Co., LLC v. 17.19 Acres of Prop. Located in Maricopa 
Cnty., 627 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 113. 497 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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ing market information.”114  The court found this definition sufficiently broad 
to protect a cooperative that acted as a bargaining agent on behalf of farm-
ers.115 
The definition relied on by the court in Treasure Valley, while broad 
enough to include conduct beyond selling, seems to exclude pre-production 
agreements to limit supply; the definition focuses on post-production activi-
ties.  All of the enumerated activities are inherent in the general definition of 
“transferring title” or “moving goods.”  It is inapposite, on the other hand, to 
talk of “transferring title” to or “moving goods” that do not exist.116 
Other cases have followed Treasure Valley in relying on this dictionary 
definition of “marketing.”117  In Northern California Supermarkets, Inc. v. 
Central California Lettuce Producers Cooperative, the court expressly relied 
on the definition of “marketing” used in Treasure Valley. 118  The cooperative 
in that case exchanged information between growers and set a price band 
within which its members were authorized to sell.119  The court held that the 
cooperative’s activities “fall within the term ‘marketing’ as broadly construed 
in Treasure Valley.”120  Even if the construction of the term was broad 
enough to include the information-exchange and price-setting activity of that 
cooperative, the court nevertheless quoted the dictionary definition and em-
phasized that the cooperative was “supplying market information and per-
forming other acts . . . involved in the transferring of title’ of the produce.”121 
The defendants in the Potatoes litigation argued that Central California 
Lettuce supports exemption for supply controls because the lettuce coopera-
tive limited shipments to those that could be sold within the agreed-upon 
price window.122  These activities, however, still involved post-production 
restrictions on sales of existing produce.  The “aggregate of functions” in 
 
 114. Id. at 215 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1953)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Cf. id. 
 117. See N. Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413 F. 
Supp. 984, 992 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (setting of price floor and ceiling by lettuce coopera-
tive fell within definition of “marketing”), aff’d sub nom. N. Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. 
v. Cent. Cal. Producers Coop., 580 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1978); Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. 
Yankee Milk, Inc., No. 75-140, 1979 WL 1723, at *4 (D. Vt. Nov. 2, 1979) (price 
fixing by milk cooperative fell within definition of “marketing”), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Newark Gardens, Inc. v. Mich. Potato In-
dus. Comm’n, 847 F.2d 1201, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that state potato commis-
sion activity was not within definition of “marketing” in Agricultural Fair Practices 
Act because it did not engage in the “sale or transfer of title in potatoes from grower 
to shipper to retailer to consumer[,]” rejecting analogy to Treasure Valley). 
 118. 413 F. Supp. at 991. 
 119. Id. at 986. 
 120. Id. at 992 (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. 
 122. In re Potatoes Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
103, at 14-16. 
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“transferring title” and “moving goods” must include refusal to transfer goods 
that do not meet the prescribed contract conditions.  Those restrictions on 
transfer of goods fit much more comfortably within the Treasure Valley defi-
nition of “marketing” than the refusal to produce “goods” at all. 
More recent dictionary definitions of “marketing” seem to similarly ex-
clude production limitations.  For example, Random House’s dictionary con-
tains two definitions: “the act of buying or selling in a market,” and “the total 
of activities involved in the transfer of goods from the producer or seller to 
the consumer or buyer, including advertising, shipping, storing, and sell-
ing.”123  This definition, like the one relied on in Treasure Valley, seems lim-
ited to activities relating to goods that actually exist.  American Heritage lists 
a narrow definition nearly identical to the first Random House definition, and 
a second, broader definition: “The strategic functions involved in identifying 
and appealing to a particular group of consumers, often including activities 
such as advertising, branding, pricing, and sales.”124  This broader definition, 
with its focus on fostering a relationship with a desired consumer, seems 
equally to exclude agreements not to produce and therefore to eliminate the 
consumer. 
B.  Noscitur a Sociis: Taking Clues from Neighboring Words 
The defendants in the Potatoes litigation stopped short of arguing that 
output-restrictions fall within the definition of “marketing,” relying instead 
on arguments for the economic identity between price-fixing and output re-
strictions.  Similarly, instead of isolating any one term, the court in the Pota-
toes litigation considered the phrase “processing, preparing for market, han-
dling, and marketing” as a whole.125  The court expressed the opinion that this 
phrase “applies to acts done to an agricultural product after it has been plant-
ed and harvested.”126 
The canon of noscitur a sociis, “words and people are known by their 
companions,”127 instructs statutory interpretation when statutes use items in a 
list that share a common attribute, such as enumerations of prohibited or ex-
empted conduct.128  The Court has stated its assumption that legislatures 
 
 123. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987). 
 124. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1075 (5th ed. 
2011). 
 125. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 
(D. Idaho 2011). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 (2013); see also Freeman v. 
Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2042 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 
603-04 (2010); Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 255 (2000). 
 128. See Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) (“That several items 
in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as pos-
sessing that attribute as well.”); see also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 
547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006) (rejecting application of canon to item not part of a list); 
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would be familiar with conventional canons of statutory construction when 
drafting statutes, and thus courts interpreting statutory language may fairly 
incorporate those canons into their readings of the text.129  One empirical 
study of legislative drafting has confirmed that drafters recognize and rely on 
the principle expressed by the canon noscitur a sociis – that words in a list are 
defined in relation to each other.130 
The Supreme Court has employed the “commonsense canon”131 of 
noscitur a sociis to avoid giving “unintended breadth” to statutory terms.132  
In United States v. Williams, for example, the Court construed a statute pre-
scribing criminal penalties for anyone who “advertises, promotes, presents, 
distributes, or solicits” child pornography.133  Petitioners alleged that the stat-
ute was unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.134  The Court held that two of 
the verbs, “promotes” and “presents,” had a wider array of possible meanings 
than the other three verbs, which clearly denoted a transfer of product.135  The 
Court held that, in context, the verbs “promotes” and “presents” could be 
clearly understood to denote a transfer, whether commercial or noncommer-
cial.136  The Court used the other verbs in the list as guidance to choose the 
narrowest of multiple dictionary definitions of the disputed terms.137  Other 
cases have similarly relied on the commonsense canon to narrow the meaning 
of potentially broader terms.138 
 
Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (applying canon to list of 
terms used as examples to define another statutory term), superseded by statute, Pa-
perwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-37, 109 Stat. 163, as recognized in 
In re Lazarus, Inc., 7 E.A.D. 318 (EAB 1997). 
 129. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (“It is 
presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory 
construction . . . .”); see also U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) 
(“We start with a common rule, with which we presume congressional familiarity, . . . 
that any waiver of the National Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivo-
cal . . . .”) (citing McNary, 498 U.S. at 496), superseded by statute as stated in Parker 
v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1006 n.15 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 130. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From 
the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Can-
ons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 907, 952 (2013). 
 131. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008). 
 132. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). 
 133. 553 U.S. at 295; see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
 134. 553 U.S. at 288. 
 135. Id. at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 294-95. 
 138. See, e.g., Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2042 (2012) 
(interpreting the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act’s prohibition on receiving 
“portion, split, or percentage,” defined as limited to receiving less than the entirety; 
“split” narrows potentially broader terms “portion” and “procedure”); United States v. 
Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 435 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding phrase “substantial emotional dis-
tress” did not render cyberstalking statute overbroad under First Amendment where 
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While it is clear that the terms “processing,” “preparing for market” and 
“handling” apply to post-production activities, the term “marketing” is, in 
isolation, susceptible to broader meanings such as an agreement to limit sup-
ply.  The Supreme Court has stated, however, that where “several items in a 
list share an attribute [the other items are interpreted] . . . as possessing that 
attribute as well.”139  Thus, applying the canon of noscitur a sociis to read 
“marketing” in context with the other actions in the list supports the view that 
the term “marketing” applies only to post-production activities. 
C.  Design of the Statute as a Whole: Reading Section 1 with Section 2 
Although the pending lawsuits focus on the conduct exempted by Sec-
tion 1, the Capper-Volstead Act contains one (and only one) other section, 
which provides protection to the public from high prices.  Another familiar 
canon of statutory construction requires that “the court must look to the par-
ticular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the 
statute as a whole.”140  Thus, to determine the meaning of “marketing” (or the 
phrase “processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing”), courts 
must read those exemptions of Section 1 in light of the protections of Section 
2.  “Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provi-
sion of a statute.”141 
Section 2 provides that the Secretary of Agriculture may investigate and 
halt any conduct of an agricultural cooperative that “monopolizes or restrains 
trade in interstate or foreign commerce to such an extent that the price of any 
agricultural product is unduly enhanced by reason thereof . . . .”142  If the 
Secretary believes such conduct is occurring, he or she may issue a com-
plaint, conduct a hearing, and for good cause order the association “to cease 
 
phrase was part of a list of serious criminal conduct including “kill, injure, harass, or 
place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause sub-
stantial emotional distress”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Worth Bullion 
Group, Inc., 717 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the phrase “consumer financial 
institution” in the Right to Financial Privacy Act was limited by neighboring terms 
“bank, savings bank, card issuer[,] . . .  industrial loan company, trust company, sav-
ings association, building and loan, or homestead association[,] . . . credit union,” and 
therefore extended only to institutions whose central purposes included extending 
consumer credit); United States v. Kimsey, 668 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 2012) (hold-
ing that the word “rule” in the Clayton Act contempt provision did not include stand-
ing rules of court where term is part of a list of items directly addressed to a party, 
including “writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command”). 
 139. Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994). 
 140. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); see also Maracich v. 
Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2013). 
 141. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 (1993). 
 142. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (2012). 
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and desist from monopolization or restraint of trade.”143  The section also 
provides for judicial review of any such order.144 
By giving the Secretary of Agriculture the power to police monopolies 
or restraints of trade that “unduly enhance[]” prices, Section 2 makes clear 
that Section 1 does not give cooperatives carte blanche to engage in practices 
that raise consumer prices.  Section 1 exempts some conduct that might oth-
erwise be said to monopolize or restrain trade.145  Section 2 recaptures any 
exempted conduct that monopolizes or restrains trade “to such an extent” that 
prices are “unduly enhanced.”146 
The Secretary of Agriculture has never instituted an enforcement action 
under Section 2, so little guidance exists as to its meaning.147  Undue en-
hancement has not been precisely defined, although the Secretary of Agricul-
ture has proposed more than one definition,148 and commentators have pro-
posed others.149  One way of understanding the difference between the ex-
emptions for farmers under Section 1 and the protections for consumers under 
Section 2 is the notion of countervailing and supervailing market power.150  
Countervailing power would allow farmers to overcome the market failures 
that would otherwise prevent them from receiving fair prices from a buyers’ 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012). 
 146. § 292. 
 147. See Peter C. Carstensen, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Law: Obsolete 
Statutes in a Dynamic Economy, 58 S.D. L. Rev. 462, 491-92 (2013); DONALD A. 
FREDERICK, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANTITRUST STATUS OF FARMER COOPERATIVES: 
THE STORY OF THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD ACT 277-82 (2002), available at 
http://www.rd.usda.gov/files/CIR59.pdf.  Commentators have suggested several pos-
sible reasons for the lack of enforcement under Section 2: the Secretary may police 
food prices more through enforcement of mandatory marketing orders than through 
monitoring of cooperative activities, see Ralph H. Folsom, Antitrust Enforcement 
Under the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1636-
37 (1980), cooperatives may have traditionally been too small to garner much atten-
tion, id., the USDA’s mission to foster the development of cooperatives may be in 
tension with its role under Section 2, id., or the limited remedies of Section 2 en-
forcement compared with the lure of treble damages under private antitrust statutes 
may prompt aggrieved parties to pursue litigation rather than complain to the Secre-
tary, FREDERICK, supra, at 282. 
 148. See David L. Baumer, Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183, 195-201, 
202 nn.62-63 (1986) (summarizing four distinct statements by USDA on the meaning 
of undue enhancement). 
 149. See id. at 203 (price that exceeds equilibrium between countervailing and 
supervailing prices); Folsom, supra note 147, at 1636-37 (prices exceeding those that 
would ordinarily exist under conditions of effective competition in the relevant mar-
ket). 
 150. See Baumer, supra note 148, at 202-03. 
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monopsony.151  Supervailing power, on the other hand, goes beyond correct-
ing market failures created by the buyers’ monopsony and introduces a new 
market failure, allowing the sellers (farmers) to engage in monopolistic be-
havior to the detriment of consumers.152  With countervailing power, farmers 
take money from predatory intermediaries, with prices to consumers remain-
ing constant.  With supervailing power, farmers take money from the end 
consumer.  Section 2 may be read to protect consumers against the latter pos-
sibility. 
The pending complaints in the potatoes, mushrooms, eggs, and dairy 
cases all allege that prices to consumers were artificially inflated as a result of 
the defendants’ conduct.153  The cooperatives at issue in those cases have 
achieved high market concentrations,154 lowering or eliminating concerns 
about monopsony power of intermediary buyers in those markets.  In essence, 
Capper-Volstead has already had its intended effect of cutting out intermedi-
aries by allowing farmers to organize to engage in post-production activities 
connected with selling products.  To allow farmers to engage in production-
limiting agreements, which have the sole purpose of driving up prices to con-
sumers, would exceed the level of protection provided to farmers by Section 
1. 
Capper-Volstead expressly exempts “marketing” from antitrust liability, 
but provides consumer protection from undue enhancement of prices.  The 
forms of “marketing” that have been recognized as exempted by Capper-
Volstead serve dual goals.  In addition to increasing farmer incomes, the 
marketing exemptions also help to effectuate the terms of cooperatives’ mar-
keting agreements for existing stock, overcoming information asymmetries 
 
 151. Id. at 198-99. 
 152. Id. at 199-201. 
 153. See In re Eggs Fifth Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra 
note 31, at ¶ 8; Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 
78-79, 112-30; In re Mushrooms Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Com-
plaint, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 1,7, 62-63; In re Potatoes First Amended Class Action 
Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 4, 105. 
 154. For example, by 2008, 79 percent of milk produced in the United States was 
marketed by the largest dairy cooperative.  See Robert G. Abrams et al., United 
States: Private Antitrust Litigation, ANTITRUST REV. OF THE AMS. 2014, Sept. 2013, at 
35, available at http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/News/Articles/
LITIGATION/2013/Abrams-Foix-Commins-US-Private-Antitrust-Litigation.pdf; see 
also In re Eggs Fifth Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 31, 
at ¶ 4 (alleging that defendant trade group United Egg Producers’ members represent-
ed 96 percent of nation’s laying hens during class period); In re Mushrooms Revised 
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 2 (alleging that 
defendant Eastern Mushroom Marketing Cooperative controlled over 60 percent of 
Agaricus mushrooms grown in the United States and about 90 percent of all Agaricus 
mushrooms grown in the eastern United States during class period); In re Potatoes 
First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 10-13 (alleging that de-
fendant United Potato Growers Association members accounted for 70 to 80 percent 
of fresh-market potatoes in the United States during class period). 
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and unequal bargaining power in the marketplace between the large number 
of sellers (farmers) and the small number of buyers (intermediaries).  Produc-
tion limiting agreements, by contrast, serve only to raise prices to the end 
consumer by limiting the number of products being marketed.  To extend the 
term “marketing” to include conduct, such as production limitations, that has 
the sole effect of raising prices paid by the final consumer would appear to be 
contrary to the statute when Section 1 is read in conjunction with the con-
sumer protection concerns of Section 2. 
D.  Exemptions from the Antitrust Laws Should Be Interpreted       
Narrowly 
Supreme Court antitrust cases “consistently hold that exemptions from 
the antitrust laws must be construed narrowly.”155  This rule applies not only 
to judge-made exemptions156 but also to express statutory exemptions such as 
the Capper-Volstead Act.157  Because antitrust laws theoretically ensure free 
markets, courts presume that Congress has carefully weighed the economic 
costs and benefits of departures from that rule and that those judgments 
should not be extended. 
The rule was first articulated with respect to an express exemption in a 
1956 case, United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.158  In that case, the 
Court was asked to interpret the exemption to Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
created by the “fair trade acts,” which permitted manufacturers to set mini-
mum resale prices for wholesalers and retailers.159  The Court held that the act 
did not exempt agreements between a producer-wholesaler and its wholesaler 
customer-competitors.160  The Court dismissed economic policy arguments 
by both parties as inviting the courts to go beyond the limits on price fixing 
set by statute: “Congress has marked the limitations beyond which price fix-
 
 155. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982); see also 
Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 147-48 (1983); Grp. Life & 
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979); Abbott Labs. v. Port-
land Retail Druggists Ass’n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 11 (1976); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seat-
rain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 
Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 
(1942). 
 156. See, e.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (narrowly construing baseball antitrust exemption recognized by Federal Base-
ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200 (1922)). 
 157. See Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 231 (McCarran-Ferguson Act); Abbott 
Labs., 425 U.S. at 11-12 (the Nonprofit Institutions Act); Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 
U.S. at 733 (the Shipping Act); McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. at 310-12 (Mil-
ler-Tydings and McGuire Acts). 
 158. 351 U.S. 305. 
 159. Id. at 309-10. 
 160. Id. at 310-12. 
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ing cannot go.  We are not only bound by those limitations but we are bound 
to construe them strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege restric-
tive of a free economy.”161 
One court declined to apply this rule of construction to a case interpret-
ing the Capper-Volstead Act, but that case involved interpretation of a term 
that was clearly defined in the Clayton Act.162  In Northland Cranberries, Inc. 
v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.,163 the plaintiffs argued that a cooperative 
that included foreign producers did not fall within the term “persons” entitled 
to the Capper-Volstead exemption.164  The court rejected this argument be-
cause the language of the statute was “plain and unambiguous . . . .”165  The 
court noted that Congress enacted Capper-Volstead to extend the protections 
of Section 6 of the Clayton Act, which expressly defines “persons” to include 
foreign corporations and associations.166 
By contrast, the term “marketing” is not defined in the Capper-Volstead 
Act or the Clayton Act, and dictionary definitions of the term do not clearly 
and unambiguously apply to output restrictions.167  The defendants in the 
Potatoes litigation, like the defendants in McKesson, urge an economic ar-
gument – specifically, the purported economic equivalence between price 
fixing and output restrictions – to support their position.168  But the Capper-
Volstead Act by its terms exempts only “processing, preparing for market, 
handling, and marketing . . . .”169  Only a broad reading of the term “market-
ing” would include making agreements not to produce items for sale in the 
 
 161. Id. at 316.  The Court relied on its 1942 decision in United States v. Masonite 
Corp., in which it held that valid patents did not allow manufacturers to engage in 
price agreements with competitors who owned patents on similar, substitutable prod-
ucts.  316 U.S. 265 (1942).  In Masonite Corp., the Court held that the patent laws 
were “privileges restrictive of a free economy,” and therefore “the rights which Con-
gress has attached to them must be strictly construed.”  Id. at 280. 
 162. Northland Cranberries, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 
2d 221, 225 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. at 226. 
 165. Id. at 225. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass’n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 
F.2d 203, 215 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 168. See In re Potatoes Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 103, at 15-16.  This purported equivalence is questionable in any event.  While 
restricting supply may have the same effect on prices as price-fixing if pricing agree-
ments are uniformly observed, producers who have already sunk costs into producing 
a product have an incentive to sell at any price equal to or higher than the cost of 
production – a price that may be lower than the agreement price.  Such sales should 
have net efficiency gains since both buyers and sellers are better off.  Under output-
restricting agreements, however, production costs have not been incurred, so produc-
ers lack the incentive to recover those costs by selling at a price lower than the 
agreement price. 
 169. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2012). 
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first place.  Especially in light of the effect of scarcity on consumer prices, 
such a definition would be restrictive of a free economy and should be disfa-
vored. 
IV.  INTENTIONALISM: AMBIGUITY SHOULD NOT OVERRIDE PLAIN 
MEANING 
The plain meaning of the phrase “processing, preparing for market, han-
dling, and marketing,” based on traditional tools of statutory construction, 
seems to point away from the conclusion that Capper-Volstead exempts pro-
duction restrictions by cooperatives.  To the extent that courts find ambiguity 
in the text, a review of legislative history may shed light on the intent of 
Congress in using the statutory language at issue and whether the purpose of 
the Act is consistent with output restrictions. 
Judges continue to debate the extent to which courts may legitimately 
look to the legislative history of a statute in interpreting its meaning.  Justice 
Breyer has argued that legislative history, while not “law,” is nevertheless 
“helpful in trying to understand the meaning of the words that do make up the 
statute or the ‘law.’”170  Critics, like Justice Scalia, object that legislative his-
tory can be easily manipulated, offering “something for everybody.”171 
The Supreme Court has stated that, “[i]f legislative history is to be con-
sidered, it is preferable to consult the documents prepared by Congress when 
deliberating.”172  The most authoritative sources are the Committee Reports 
on the bill.173  Statements by individual legislators should not be given con-
trolling weight, but may provide evidence of congressional intent when they 
are consistent with the statutory language and other pieces of legislative his-
tory.174  In the case of the Capper-Volstead Act, the Committee Reports on 
 
 170. Breyer, supra note 107, at 863. 
 171. SCALIA, supra note 108, at 36.  This debate has also been the subject of ex-
tensive academic commentary.  See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 130, at 970-
71 (empirical study of interpretive methodologies actually known and used by con-
gressional staffers in drafting legislation); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1948 (2008) (analyzing textualist interpretations of juris-
dictional statutes to test allegiance of textualism to reliance on plain language); Frank 
B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1971, 2001 (2007) (empirical analysis comparing influence of textualist and 
intentionalist methodologies); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (arguing for moderate statement of textualism to 
avoid risk of irrelevance from overstatement of differences from purposivism); John 
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005) (describ-
ing textualists’ view of legislative intent). 
 172. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 580 (1995). 
 173. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 
168, 186 (1969). 
 174. Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 
465 U.S. 555, 567 (1984); see also Coors Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 787 F. 
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the bill from both the Sixty-seventh Congress and the previous version of the 
bill in the Sixty-sixth Congress provide scant clues, numbering only a handful 
of pages in total.175  Thus, the primary source of legislative intent for the Act 
is the floor debates in the Sixty-seventh Congress, as informed by debates in 
the Sixty-sixth Congress. 
A.  Congress Did Not Debate Output Limitations 
Congress did not expressly debate whether the Act would exempt 
agreements to restrict production.176  Because of the lack of debate on the 
topic, it is difficult to conclude whether or not Congress intended for “mar-
keting” to include limiting production. 
A few comments supporting production controls can be drawn from the 
debates in the Sixty-seventh Congress that passed the Act and the Sixty-sixth 
Congress that debated a nearly-identical bill.  In the House debates in the 
Sixty-seventh Congress, Representative Hersey advocated for the bill, saying, 
“It does away with the middleman, the speculator, and the importer; in brief, 
it enables the producers to act together for their mutual interests in the plant-
ing, care, and marketing of agricultural products.”177  In the Senate, Senator 
Cummings stated, “I think [the farmer] is entitled to enter into his associa-
tions for the purpose of protecting himself not only in production but in mar-
keting his products.”178  In debates in the Sixty-sixth Congress, Senator 
Townsend said, “Without the right to determine the best market, without the 
right to cooperate in production and disposition of products, the farm will 
continue to be a very unprofitable, unsuccessful place where men and women 
can work.”179  In the Sixty-seventh Congress, Senator Lenroot stated, 
If the farmers of the United States could, through cooperation, have 
some control and agreement as to production and as to prices, not for 
 
Supp. 2d 149, 170 (D.P.R. 2011) (“The words of a legislative body itself, written or 
spoken contemporaneously with the passage of a statute, are usually the most authori-
tative guide to legislative purpose.” (quoting Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 
505 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 175. See S. REP. NO. 67-236 (1921) (three pages); H. REP. NO. 24 (1921) (three 
pages); S. REP. NO. 66-611 (1920) (two pages); H. REP. NO. 66-939 (1920) (two pag-
es). 
 176. The defendants in the Potatoes litigation tacitly acknowledged this absence: 
In their brief in support of summary judgment, the defendants opened their discussion 
of legislative history by noting the lack of evidence to exclude supply agreements.  In 
re Potatoes Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 16 
(“[N]othing in the statutory language or the legislative history of the statutes suggests 
that indirect price setting through an agreement limiting supply falls outside the Cap-
per-Volstead protections.”). 
 177. 61 CONG. REC. 1043 (1922) (statement of Rep. Hersey) (emphasis added). 
 178. 62 CONG. REC. 2266 (1922) (statement of Sen. Cummings). 
 179. 60 CONG. REC. 376 (1920) (statement of Sen. Townsend). 
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the purposes of making exorbitant profits, but so that they might at 
least secure back the cost of production, we would see in the United 
States immediately an upward turn toward prosperity. . . . [W]e are 
justified in enacting this legislation which will enable the farmers of 
this country to put themselves somewhat nearer an equality of bar-
gaining power and control of output in production that other industries 
have to-day.180    
While these statements suggest that the speakers believed production 
limits to be exempted, there was no direct discussion of the point in the 
House or Senate in either the Sixty-sixth or Sixty-seventh Congresses.  These 
comments also appear to be inconsistent with statements made by other 
members of Congress that assume that cooperatives would not be allowed to 
limit production.  For example, the notion that the bill was necessary to allow 
farmers to operate like other businesses, as stated by Senator Lenroot, was 
expressed frequently by many members of Congress throughout the de-
bates.181  Those remarks, however, do not necessarily suggest that the speaker 
presumed that the bill would permit farmers to control output.  Instead, in 
many cases, the speaker advocated for the bill precisely because he believed 
that the structure of agricultural markets prevents farmers from restricting 
output the way corporations do.  The exemption, the members argued, was 
needed to offset this hardship endemic to agricultural markets. 
Remarks by Representative Volstead and Senator Hitchcock indicate an 
intent to put farmers on the same footing as other businessmen.182  Senator 
Hitchcock stated, 
. . . when there is a check in demand for the products which they are 
making [the manufacturers] can reduce the production[,] . . . discharge 
their men, cut down their forces, and run their factories upon what is 
called 25 or 30 percent capacity, and merely feed out to the market 
what it will consume at their prices . . . 
The farmer can not do that. . . .  He is not in a position to do as a man-
ufacturer does.  He can not control his markets and he can not make 
 
 180. 62 CONG. REC. 2225 (1922) (statement of Sen. Lenroot). 
 181. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2258 (1922) (statement of Sen. Norris) (“[I]t is not 
a square deal to say to the farm, ‘Everything you buy you must buy from a controlled 
proposition, a trust; the price of everything you sell will be fixed by another monopo-
ly,’ and not give him an opportunity to get into the same kind of a game.”); 61 CONG. 
REC. 1044 (1921) (statement of Rep. Volstead) (“With [Section 2] in the bill, it seems 
to me it will give to these organizations a status of equality with other business con-
cerns, and that is all the farmers ask.”); 61 CONG. REC. 1035 (1921) (statement of 
Rep. Reavis) (“This bill is for the purpose of permitting an organization that will 
place him on an equality with every other American business man and in some meas-
ure permit him to fix the price of his products.”). 
 182. See 61 CONG. REC. 1033 (1921) (statement of Rep. Volstead); 62 CONG. 
REC. 2262 (1922) (statement of Sen. Hitchcock). 
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his own prices, and he never ought to have been made subject to the 
provisions of the antitrust law.183 
Similarly, Rep. Volstead argued, 
Business men can combine by putting their money into corporations, 
but it is impractical for farmers to combine their farms into similar 
corporate form.  The object of this bill is to modify the laws under 
which business organizations are now formed, so that farmers may 
take advantage of the form of organization that is used by business 
concerns.184 
Both of these quotes evidence concern about the disparity between 
farmers’ situations and the situations of other businesses.  Read in context, 
however, neither comment supports the notion that Congress intended for 
farmers under the legislation to be able to limit production the way that other 
businesses may do.  Instead, the speakers argued that the legislation was nec-
essary because they assumed farmers could not control production like other 
businesses, and thus required special protections from antitrust liability to 
enable them to engage in orderly marketing.185 
For example, earlier in his comment, Senator Hitchcock supported the 
measure by stating, 
I have said that the farmer never should have been included in the an-
titrust bills of the United States, the bills to prohibit the undue restraint 
of trade.  The farmer is not in trade.  His goods are marketed upon ex-
actly the opposite theory from the marketing of the goods of men who 
are in trade.186 
Senator Hitchcock’s full remarks demonstrate congressional concern 
about various facts of agricultural markets that left farmers more vulnerable 
to market fluctuations than other businesses.  Specifically, farmers are “price-
takers.”187  Senator Hitchcock continued, 
 
 183. 62 CONG. REC. 2262 (1922).  The defendants in Potatoes pointed to testimo-
ny of Senator Hitchcock that would permit agricultural producers “to withhold and 
limit production from the market.”  In re Potatoes Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 18 (quoting 62 CONG. REC. 2277 (1922) (statement of 
Sen. Hitchcock)).  That testimony referred only to withholding agricultural products 
already produced and did not deal expressly with agreements to limit production. 
 184. 61 CONG. REC. 1033 (1921). 
 185. See id. 
 186. 62 CONG. REC. 2262 (1922). 
 187. See MURRAY FULTON, FARMERS AS PRICE TAKERS: HOW FARM RETURNS ARE 
ESTABLISHED (2005) (publication of Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute), available 
at http://www.capi-icpa.ca/archives/pdfs/PapID6_MFulton.pdf; GARY W. BRESTER & 
J.B. PENN, STRATEGIC BUSINESS MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL 
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A man with a manufacturing institution produces his product with a 
very accurate knowledge of what it costs to purchase his raw material 
and to employ his labor and he puts his product upon the market at a 
price which he himself fixes.  The farmer, on the other hand, is com-
pelled, when his product is ready for market, to sell it on the market at 
the prices which the buyers on that market fix.  If it is wheat he is sell-
ing, he sells it at the price which the elevator in the town nearest to 
him offers for that wheat, and that elevator takes the price from the 
grain center nearest by, and that center takes it, perhaps, from the New 
York market, and that, perhaps from the London market. 
So when the farmer markets his goods he is not marketing them at the 
price he puts upon them.  The price at which he markets them has no 
relation whatever to the cost of production.  He has labored nearly a 
year to produce his crop, and when it is produced he is compelled, 
through his necessities, almost immediately to throw it upon the mar-
ket and take whatever price is offered to him.188 
While supportive of the Capper-Volstead bill, Senator Hitchcock advo-
cated a different approach to relieving these market pressures: an agricultural 
credit system that would allow farmers to withhold production from market 
until prices rise, thus rationalizing the supply of that product to the market: 
My judgment is that this country should in some way develop a sys-
tem of agricultural credit, so that the farmer may be relieved from that 
necessity of throwing his crop upon the market immediately after he 
has finished its production after months and months of labor.  There 
ought to be some system of personal credit by which he could hold 
that crop for a few months and market it gradually, because the very 
necessities of the agricultural classes, which compel them to throw all 
their crops upon the market simultaneously and almost instantly, result 
inevitably in an undue depression of the market.189 
The agricultural credit system advocated by Senator Hitchcock was in 
fact created, beginning with the passage of the first Farm Bill, the Agricultur-
al Adjustment Act of 1933.190  Numerous features of agricultural finance and 
 
PRODUCTION SECTOR IN A CHANGING GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM 10 (1999), available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/29161/1/pip11.pdf. 
 188. 62 CONG. REC. 2262. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See WILLARD C. COCHRANE & C. FORD RUNGE, REFORMING FARM POLICY: 
TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA 40 (1992).  Certain aspects of the 1933 Act were held 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler.  297 U.S. 1 (1936).  
After Butler, Congress quickly passed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment 
Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-461, 49 Stat. 1148 (1937), which removed the processing 
tax struck down by Butler, and a number of statutes that formed the foundation for 
much of current federal farm policy: the Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act of 
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credit, farm commodity program payments, and marketing orders and agree-
ments have eased the impact of unique market burdens on farmers.191  To 
respond to market gluts at harvest time, for example, federal farm policy as 
early as 1938 introduced nonrecourse loans, which allow farmers to benefit 
from cyclical rises in market prices in months after harvest instead of having 
to sell the crop to pay creditors at harvest time when prices are lowest. 192  In 
the current version, the Marketing Assistance Loan program, farmers of des-
ignated crops are eligible to receive government loans at a specified per-unit 
price, pledging the crop as collateral.193  If market prices are below the loan 
rate at maturity, the farmer may repay at the local market price and keep the 
difference as a “marketing loan gain.”194  Alternatively, instead of taking a 
loan with the crop as collateral, the farmer may request a payment, called a 
“loan deficiency payment,” equal to the difference between the loan rate and 
the market price.195 
The disparity between farm businesses and other businesses occupied 
much congressional attention and led to suggestions for additional reform of 
agricultural markets, either instead of or in addition to the bill under discus-
sion.  Numerous members pointed out that farmers, unlike other businesses, 
have limited power to set their own prices,196 and that harvest gluts place 
 
1935, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat. 942 (1935); the Agricultural Marketing Agreement 
Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 246 (1937) (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. §§ 601-624, 671-674 (2012)); and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 
Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-
1293 (2012)). 
 191. For an overview of the history of farm policy, see Anne B. W. Effland, U.S. 
Farm Policy: The First 200 Years, in SUSAN A. SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING & 
SUSTAINABILITY: READINGS IN AGRICULTURAL LAW 5-12 (2011); COCHRANE & 
RUNGE, supra note 190, at 39-63. 
 192. See COCHRANE & RUNGE, supra note 190, at 41-42 (nonrecourse loans in 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938).  “Nonrecourse” means that the collateral can 
be forfeited at the end of the term without penalty, and the government must accept 
the collateral and may not sue the farmer to recover any difference in value.  See JIM 
MONKE, FARM COMMODITY PROGRAMS IN THE 2008 FARM BILL 12 n.22 (2008), 
available at http://farmpolicy.typepad.com/farmpolicy/files/crs_report_farm_comm-
oidty_program_in_o8_fb.pdf. 
 193. See DENNIS A. SHIELDS, FARM COMMODITY PROGRAMS IN THE 2014 FARM 
BILL 11 (2014), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets
/crs/R43448.pdf. 
 194. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FARM SERVICE AGENCY, 
USDA, 2014 FARM BILL FACT SHEET: NONRECOURSE MARKETING ASSISTANCE 
LOANS AND LOAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS 3 (2014), available at http://www.fsa.usda.
gov/Internet/FSA_File/mal_ldp_2014.pdf. 
 195. SHIELDS, supra note 193, at 11; FARM SERVICE AGENCY, supra note 194, at 
3. 
 196. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2262 (1922) (statement of Sen. Hitchcock) (“The 
farmer, on the other hand, is compelled, when his product is ready for market, to sell 
it on the market at the price which the buyers on that market fix.”); 62 CONG. REC. 
2260 (1922) (statement of Sen. Simmons) (“[E]verything that he produces . . . must 
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farmers in an especially vulnerable position.197  Several members, like Sena-
tor Hitchcock, advocated for a system of financial support for farmers.198  
These comments foreshadowed a new era of federal support for agriculture 
beginning in the inter-War period and continuing today,199 characterized by 
programs such as the price and income supports of the Farm Bills,200 the fed-
 
be sold in the open market for whatever price this organized business, into whose 
hands his products falls, is willing to give.”); 62 CONG. REC. 2217 (1922) (statement 
of Sen. Calder) (“But this vast business was done largely by men who are unor-
ganized, who were compelled to take whatever they could get for their products, who 
had no voice in naming the reward they should receive for the service they had per-
formed.”); 61 CONG. REC. 1035 (1921) (statement of Rep. Reavis) (“Coming from an 
agricultural district, I state it as a fact that the farmer has always been compelled to 
take for his product the price that the purchaser offered, or he does not sell it.”). 
 197. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2262 (1922) (statement of Sen. Hitchcock) (“He has 
labored nearly a year to produce his crop, and when it is produced he is compelled, 
through his necessities, almost immediately to throw it upon the market and take 
whatever price is offered to him.”); 62 CONG. REC. 2058 (1922) (statement of Sen. 
Capper) (“More and more it has become evident that the growers must have an oppor-
tunity to merchandise their products in an orderly way, instead of being compelled to 
dump them on a glutted market at prices below cost of production.”); 62 CONG. REC. 
2052 (1922) (statement of Sen. Kellogg) (“[T]ake the fruit crop, the apple crop, the 
potato crop.  It must be harvested at a certain time. . . .  You can not dump all the 
production on the country at once and have the farmer receive a good price.”); 61 
CONG. REC. 1033 (1921) (statements of Rep. Blanton and Rep. Volstead) (“MR. 
BLANTON.  The purpose is, I take it, . . . to permit [farmers] to hold their products 
while there is a ‘bear’ market on that would take their property from them?  MR. 
VOLSTEAD.  Yes; the same as other corporations do.”); 60 CONG. REC. 360-61 (1920) 
(statement of Sen. Kellogg) (“Consequently the markets were glutted; people could 
not buy all the products when they were glutted, and at other seasons of the year they 
had to pay enormous prices and many times could not get fruit.”). 
 198. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2263 (1922) (statement of Sen. Hitchcock) (“[W]e 
ought to have affirmative legislative provision under which we can build up a system 
of credit to help agriculture in carrying its crops a reasonable length of time, and mar-
keting them in a gradual way.”); 61 CONG. REC. 1042 (1921) (statement of Rep. 
Sumners) (“The fact is, our entire agricultural program should be built around a prop-
er system of sale and distribution of agricultural products, with a properly adjusted 
credit system.”). 
 199. See Effland, supra note 191, at 5, 9-10 (describing that the advent of the 
fourth era of federal farm policy since 1924 “focused on direct government interven-
tion to provide farm income support” through supply controls and price and income 
supports).  Earlier eras had been characterized by land distribution and expansion of 
settlement (1785-1890); improved productivity through federal support for research 
and education (1830-1914); and limited market regulation, infrastructure improve-
ments, and provision of economic information to help farmers compete in the new 
industrial age.  Id. at 5-8. 
 200. The first Farm Bill focused on price supports through a combination of man-
datory supply controls and government storage of surpluses.  For a discussion of the 
creation of early farm income support programs, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, 2 THE 
AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, 1933-1935, at 27-68 (1959).  
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eral farm credit system and direct government lending to agriculture,201 and 
subsidized crop insurance and disaster assistance programs.202 
Moreover, members of Congress assumed that the atomistic nature of 
agricultural production contained a built-in safeguard against monopolistic 
prices.203  In committee reports and floor debates, Congress repeatedly ex-
pressed the belief that a farmers’ monopoly was impossible.204  Many mem-
bers of Congress argued that high market prices resulting from coordinated 
marketing would always give farmers an incentive to increase production and 
bring down market prices.205  Even if conditions have changed – for example, 
agricultural cooperatives operating under Capper-Volstead now exercise sig-
nificant market power over certain commodity streams206 – the members’ 
understanding of agricultural markets at the time sheds light on their intent as 
to the scope of the exemption. 
 
For a discussion of the current state of federal farm programs, see SCHNEIDER, supra 
note 191, at 54-57; SHIELDS, supra note 193, passim. 
 201. The Farm Credit System, a network of federally-chartered financial institu-
tions and related entities organized as borrower-cooperatives, specializes in providing 
credit to agriculture.  See Christopher R. Kelley & Barbara J. Hoekstra, A Guide to 
Borrower Litigation Against the Farm Credit System and the Rights of Farm Credit 
System Borrowers, 66 N.D. L. REV. 127, 132-49 (1990).  The Farm Service Agency, 
in contrast, is a federally-owned bank that serves as a “lender of last resort” to agri-
culture, offering direct loans to agricultural entities.  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 191, 
at 215-17. 
 202. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 191, at 93-114. 
 203. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2262 (1922) (statement of Sen. Hitchcock) (“[I]t is 
not possible, by reason of the very nature of the farmer’s business and because of the 
millions of men engaged in the industry, for the farmer to combine to anything like 
the same extent the manufacturer or mercantile interests can combine, for the purpose 
of affecting prices.”). 
 204. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 67-236, at 2 (1921) (“Inasmuch as it is utterly impossi-
ble to establish a monopoly of any of the ordinary farm products, cereals, cotton, live 
stock, etc., an inhibition of monopoly must be unobjectionable to the producers.”); 62 
CONG. REC. 2270 (1922) (statement of Sen. Lenroot) (“I am not at all afraid that this 
will be exercised in either event because . . . from the very nature of things monopoly 
is impossible in farm products.”); 62 CONG. REC. 2262 (statement of Sen. Cummins) 
(“We all know that cotton can not be monopolized, that wheat can not be monopo-
lized, that corn or hogs or cattle, things that are grown in very large territories of the 
United States, can not be monopolized.”); 59 CONG. REC. 8035 (1920) (statement of 
Rep. Browne) (“It would be impossible for the millions of farmers scattered through-
out the United States to ever form a trust that would be oppressive.  If it was possible 
for them to do so, the Secretary of Agriculture under this bill could dissolve the asso-
ciation.”). 
 205. See, e.g., 60 CONG. REC. 2059 (1922) (statement of Sen. Capper) (“[A] farm-
ers’ monopoly is impossible.  If the cooperative marketing association makes its price 
too high, the result is inevitable self-destruction by overproduction in the following 
years.  No other industry except agriculture has this automatic safeguard.”). 
 206. See Abrams, supra note 154, at 35-36. 
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One question raised on the floor expressly referenced pre-production 
supply controls, but the resulting discussion was inconclusive.  In the Sixty-
sixth Congress, Senator Townsend referred to a debate earlier that week in 
the chamber about reviving the War Finance Corporation:207 
[s]ome of the advocates of the measure suggested, in the specific case 
of cotton . . . that they were advising the farmers in their part of the 
country to refrain from growing cotton, and they were advocating a 
measure whereby the Government was to aid these farmers in holding 
their crops, even as against the proposition of a forced reduction in 
production.208 
When Senator Townsend raised questions about this debate, however, 
he focused only on the right to withhold products already produced, “to hold 
their products until such a time as they feel it is proper for them to sell.”209  
He received a response from Senator Kellogg, who would become the floor 
leader for the bill before its passage in the Sixty-seventh Congress.210  Sena-
tor Kellogg, an able lawyer known for his work as a “trustbuster” and who 
would later receive the Nobel Peace Prize,211 replied that the bill did not cre-
ate government-sponsored post-production supply controls: 
 
 207. 60 CONG. REC. 362 (1920) (statement of Sen. Townsend).  Congress created 
the War Finance Corporation in 1918 to support industry during and after World War 
I because of war-driven shortages of private capital.  See Gerald D. Nash, Herbert 
Hoover and the Origins of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 46 MISS. 
VALLEY HIST. REV. 455, 456-57 (1959).  The Corporation, which had begun as a war 
emergency agency, was revitalized in July 1921 as an agricultural credit bank.  Id. at 
459-60. 
 208. 60 CONG. REC. 362 (1920); see also 60 CONG. REC. 375 (1920).  In an ex-
tended statement two days prior in debates about the War Finance Corporation, Sena-
tor Ransdell of Louisiana, a cotton grower himself, explained that cotton prices were 
so far below the cost of production that cotton growers would not be able to afford to 
plant a crop in 1921: “[U]nless some provision be made for the orderly marketing of 
this cotton . . . at a price at least approaching its cost, the people of the South will not 
be financially able to make another crop.”  60 CONG. REC. 273 (1920).  Senator 
Ransdell quoted a letter in which English cotton manufacturer said, “The solution to 
the whole position rests with your people as to their ability to hold the goods (cotton).  
Our advice is ‘hold on like grim death.’”  Id.  Similarly, Senator Simmons argued in 
favor of permitting cotton growers “not to withhold [cotton] from the market, but to 
withhold cotton sales until there should be a cotton market and a market for cotton 
goods.”  Id. 
 209. 60 CONG. REC. 362 (1920). 
 210. See FREDERICK, supra note 147, at 108. 
 211. See L. ETHAN ELLIS, FRANK B. KELLOGG AND AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, 1925-1929, at 235-36 (1961).  Senator Kellogg, a Republican from Min-
nesota, served as Secretary of State in the Coolidge administration, as ambassador to 
Great Britain in 1923-25, and as an associate judge of the Permanent Court for Inter-
national Justice in 1930-35.  Id. at 6-10, 236.  He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1929 for his work as co-author of a treaty to outlaw war.  Id. at 206, 236. 
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Mr. President, I am not of the opinion that the Government should en-
ter into a conspiracy with farmers or anybody else to hold products for 
the purpose of forcing the price up, and this bill does not authorize an-
ything of the kind.  It authorizes cooperation in collective processing, 
preparing for market, handling and marketing products in interstate 
and foreign commerce.  That is the object of the bill, and that is what 
the bill is really for.212 
No member of Congress responded about the possibility of pre-
production supply controls. 
B.  Indirect Statements Possibly Supporting or Opposing Output 
Limitations 
Other statements from the legislative history offer indirect evidence of 
congressional attitudes about pre-production supply controls, but again, the 
evidence is mixed.  On one hand, several members of Congress emphasized 
that one of the goals of the Act was to increase production.  For example, 
during the House debates in the Sixty-sixth Congress, Representative Morgan 
stated, 
Our population is rapidly increasing.  The demand for food products 
grows annually by leaps and bounds.  We may safely encourage any 
system that will bring the producers and consumers in closer contact; 
that will provide a more efficient and more economical system of 
marketing, manufacturing, transporting, and distributing the products 
of the farm.213 
This emphasis on increasing production was echoed by numerous repre-
sentatives in the Sixty-sixth Congress.214  In the Sixty-seventh Congress, 
Senator Capper stated that, with the clarification of the legal status of agricul-
tural cooperatives, “farmers can do something to cut down the spread be-
tween the prices they now receive and those paid by consumers.  Even though 
the farmers should keep all of this saving it will stimulate production, thus 
 
 212. 60 CONG. REC. 362 (1920). 
 213. 59 CONG. REC. 7852 (1920). 
 214. See 59 CONG. REC. 8025 (1920) (statement of Rep. Hersman) (“. . . I mention 
them to show the opponents of this bill that cooperative farm associations tend to 
increase production.”); 59 CONG. REC. 8026 (1920) (statement of Rep. Towner) (“. . . 
the only object and purpose of the bill is to provide that when cooperative effort is 
necessary to facilitate and increase production it might be authorized and protected.”); 
59 CONG. REC. 8028 (1920) (statement of Rep. Larsen) (“. . . as we accomplish this it 
will increase production and solve the food problem for our too rapidly increasing 
city population.”); 59 CONG. REC. 8031 (1920) (statement of Rep. Upshaw) (“Produc-
tion must be increased or the high cost of living will never come down.”). 
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insuring more adequate supply of necessities.”215  In the Sixty-sixth Con-
gress, one representative stated the point emphatically: “The world needs 
more production.  It is essential.  If production is to increase, the conditions 
of marketing the product of the farms must be improved and simplified.  This 
measure, we hope, will assist in accomplishing this result.”216 
On the other hand, other comments provide some indirect support for 
the notion that Congress did intend to allow output restrictions.  For example, 
several members supported the notion that cooperatives should be permitted 
to withhold product already produced from the market to secure higher pric-
es.217  A few courts have upheld this right, including the Eighth Circuit in 
Alexander v. National Farmers Organization.218  The right to withhold prod-
uct from the market might, in its broadest form, include a right to restrict 
production in the first place. 
Other members broadly gave support for any agreements that would in-
crease prices for farmers.  Senator Cummins stated that the bill would support 
combinations for three purposes: lowering costs of production, lowering the 
costs of marketing, and “increas[ing] the market price of the commodity.”219  
The senator couched his remarks, however, by noting that farm products were 
often sold below the cost of production.220  Representative Husted claimed 
that the purpose of the bill was to allow farmers to organize in selling agen-
cies or for “anything else that is necessary to enable them to increase the pric-
es of their products.”221  Since Representative Husted opposed the bill, how-
ever, his interpretation of its scope may be expected to be overstated.222 
 
 215. 62 CONG. REC. 2058 (1922). 
 216. 59 CONG. REC. 8034 (1920) (statement of Rep. Barkley). 
 217. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC. 1033 (1922) (statements of Reps. Blanton and Vol-
stead) (“MR. BLANTON: The purpose is, I take it, . . . to permit [farmers] to hold their 
products while there is a ‘bear’ market on that would take their property from them?  
MR. VOLSTEAD: Yes; the same as other corporations do.”); 60 CONG. REC. 312 (1920) 
(statement of Sen. King) (“[T]hey shall not only be permitted to combine for the pur-
pose of marketing their products, but for the purpose of holding them for an indefinite 
period in order to secure higher prices . . . .”). 
 218. 687 F.2d 1173, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding cooperative’s withholding of 
milk from market for two weeks under Capper-Volstead Act), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 
937 (1983); see also N. Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Co-
op., 413 F. Supp. 984, 986-91 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (upholding agreement creating price 
band for lettuce sales and prohibiting shipments of unsold lettuce), aff’d sub nom. N. 
Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Cent. Cal. Producers Coop., 580 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Ewald Bros. Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 877 F.2d 1384, 1390 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(upholding dairy option agreement and standby pool); Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy-
men, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 643 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (upholding dairy standby pool), 
aff’d, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 219. 62 CONG. REC. 2264 (1922). 
 220. Id. 
 221. 61 CONG. REC. 1043 (1921). 
 222. See N.L.R.B. v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 
377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964) (“In [opponents’] zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably 
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Where legislative history is ambiguous, the Supreme Court has held that 
it should not be used to override the text.223  Since Congress never expressly 
debated the question of output limitations, and since statements may be 
gleaned either for or against the practice, the debates do little to shed light on 
congressional intent in using the terms “processing, preparing for market, 
handling, and marketing.” 
V.  PURPOSIVISM: RAISING PRICES TO FARMERS, BUT NOT TO 
CONSUMERS 
While the legislative history suggests that members devoted little atten-
tion to the question of output restrictions, the legislative history strongly 
demonstrates the purpose of the exemption: to allow farmers to organize in 
order to eliminate predatory buyers.  By allowing farmers to command higher 
prices from buyers and avoid the buyers’ mark-up to consumers, farm in-
comes would be increased without a corresponding rise in consumer prices.  
Protecting consumers from significant price increases was of paramount con-
cern in both the House and Senate debates, and satisfying those concerns was 
critical to the bill’s passage.  In light of this purpose, allowing agricultural 
cooperatives who have already succeeded in eliminating the monopsony 
power of intermediary purchasers to further raise prices by charging consum-
ers more seems patently inconsistent with the Act’s purpose. 
A.  The Purpose of the Act Was To Eliminate Speculation by            
Intermediaries 
The defendants in the Potatoes litigation argued that output-limitation 
agreements are protected by Capper-Volstead because “price-fixing and out-
put restrictions are two sides of the same coin.”224  The defendants cited an 
industrial organization textbook, which states that a “cartel can restrict output 
and let the demand curve determine price or raise price and let the demand 
curve determine output.  The two approaches are equivalent.”225  Some com-
 
tend to overstate its reach.”); see also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 
341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951), superseded by statute as recognized in In re Rubber-
maid Inc., 87 F.T.C. 676 (1976). 
 223. See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1267 (2011) (“Legislative 
history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create 
it.”); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950) (declining to consult 
legislative history where history “is more conflicting than the text is ambiguous”), 
superseded by statute as recognized in Ardestani v. I.N.S., 505 U.S. 129 (1991). 
 224. In re Potatoes Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
103, at 15. 
 225. Id. (quoting DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 124 (4th ed. 2004)). 
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mentators have supported this interpretation, although the court in Potatoes 
did not.226 
The Supreme Court has recognized that price fixing and supply controls 
are economically equivalent.  In United States v. Socony-Vacuum,227 the ma-
jor oil companies agreed to purchase surpluses in one regional market in or-
der to stabilize prices in another regional market.228  The Court equated sup-
ply controls with price fixing: “Where the means for price-fixing are purchas-
es or sales of the commodity in a market operation or, as here, purchases of a 
part of the supply of the commodity for the purpose of keeping it from having 
a depressive effect on the markets, [market] power may be found to exist 
though the combination does not control a substantial part of the commodi-
ty.”229  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Gulf 
Oil Corp.230 reversed a ruling in which the trial court denied admissibility of 
evidence of supply controls, stating that the complaint centered not on supply 
controls but on price fixing.231  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit stated, “an 
agreement to restrict the production of [goods] unquestionably is a price fix-
ing arrangement.”232  The court noted that, “[i]n fact, all serious attempts to 
establish a supracompetitive price must necessarily include an agreement to 
restrict output.  Otherwise the monopoly price could never be maintained.”233 
The fact that some form of supply control is necessary to maintain a 
price-fixing agreement, however, does not mean that Congress sought to ex-
empt all forms of supply control from antitrust scrutiny in the Capper-
Volstead Act.  As the court noted in Westinghouse, supply control is neces-
sary to maintain “supracompetitive” prices.  The legislative history of the 
Capper-Volstead Act, however, is replete with evidence that Congress in-
tended only to allow farmers to combine in order to eliminate the existing 
buyer’s monopsony and to obtain a reasonable profit.  Members of Congress 
repeatedly stressed that the exemption was not intended to permit farmers to 
obtain supracompetitive prices, and they included Section 2 of the Act to 
ensure it. 
Senator Kellogg introduced the bill in the Sixty-seventh Congress, stat-
ing, “The main object of the cooperative association is to get reasonable pric-
es for the farmer, principally through lessening the cost of marketing and 
selling his products and cutting down the difference between what the farmer 
 
 226. See In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 
1154-55 (D. Idaho 2011).  The court noted that Senator Capper in floor debates com-
mented that “a farmer’s monopoly is impossible because . . . [farmers will produce 
more if the price is high].”  Id. at 1157.  The court held that Congress relied on this 
safeguard when enacting the Capper-Volstead exemption.  Id. at 1156-57. 
 227. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 228. Id. at 185-90. 
 229. Id. at 224. 
 230. 558 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 231. Id. at 223. 
 232. Id. at 226. 
 233. Id. 
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receives and what the public finally pays.  That is the main object.”234  Other 
members of Congress did not mince words about the spread between farm 
and consumer prices, or the behavior of intermediaries.  Senator Capper as-
serted, “[T]here is a wide margin representing the rake-off of the speculative 
middleman.”235  One Senator referred to the “enormous spread” between the 
farm price and the consumer price as a “national scandal.”236  Senator Hitch-
cock pointed out that lower farm prices did not benefit consumers, “because 
the middleman who carries these crops and purchases them at these cut-throat 
prices gets a materially higher price when the time comes for the consumers 
to buy them.”237  Another Senator colorfully stated, “a policy can not always 
exist under which those who toil must toil at a loss and contribute to those 
who neither toil nor spin, but sit in their palaces at mahogany desks and draw 
in the rake-off in the shape of a middleman’s profit.”238  Throughout the de-
bates in both the Sixty-sixth and Sixty-seventh Congresses, members of Con-
gress advocated for the bill for the purpose of eliminating the middleman’s 
mark-up.239 
Members of Congress also repeatedly emphasized the view that elimina-
tion of the intermediary’s profit would result in lower prices for consumers, 
as well as higher prices to farmers.  Senator Norris made this point plainly: 
“The farmers contend that the cooperation which they expect to bring about 
under the provisions of the bill . . . is for the purpose of reducing the cost to 
the consumer as much as it is to increase the price to the producer, and to 
eliminate unconscionable profits in the products.”240  Senator Norris later 
indicated his agreement with this position: “I am just as anxious to protect the 
 
 234. 62 CONG. REC. 2049 (1922). 
 235. 62 CONG. REC. 2059 (1922). 
 236. 62 CONG. REC. 2121 (1922) (statement of Sen. Walsh). 
 237. 62 CONG. REC. 2263 (1922). 
 238. 62 CONG. REC. 2261 (1922) (statement of Sen. Norris). 
 239. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2051 (statement of Sen. Kellogg) (“Everyone 
knows that the difference between the price the farmer receives for his products and 
the price the consumer pays is . . . exorbitant and unreasonable . . . .”); 62 CONG. REC. 
2216 (1922) (statement of Sen. Townsend) (“If by allowing cooperative understand-
ings we can shorten the distance between producer and consumer and eliminate the 
toll gates on the way the farmer and the consumer will both be benefited.”); 62 CONG. 
REC. 2228 (statement of Sen. Phipps) (“In the past both producer and consumer have 
suffered seriously through speculation in essential food products on the part of the 
agencies standing between the two . . . .”); 61 CONG. REC. 1043 (statement of Rep. 
Hersey) (“It does away with the middleman, the speculator, and the importer . . . .”); 
59 CONG. REC. 7852 (statement of Rep. Morgan) (“The so-called middlemen can not, 
of course, all be eliminated, but all unnecessary middlemen should be eliminated.  
The so-called middlemen should not be in a position to demand excessive profits.”); 
59 CONG. REC. 8027 (1920) (statement of Rep. Mann) (“I represent the middleman.  
But I believe the present system is largely wasteful.”); 60 CONG. REC. 360 (statement 
of Sen. Kellogg) (“. . . the price the consumer pays is inordinately high as compared 
with what the farmer receives.”). 
 240. 62 CONG. REC. 2259 (1922). 
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consumer as I am to protect the producer.  I am not willing to do anything in 
favor of the producer that will be unfair or unjust to the consumer.”241  Other 
Senators and Representatives expressed the view that the bill would benefit 
consumers,242 in some cases expressly tying that benefit to an anticipated 
increase in agricultural production.243 
B.  Congress Included Section 2 To Ensure That Consumers Would 
Not Pay Higher Prices 
To ensure that this benefit to consumers would be realized, Congress in-
cluded Section 2, giving the Secretary of Agriculture power to police exces-
sive price increases by cooperatives.  In both chambers, supporters of the 
legislation emphasized that Section 2 was included to provide a safeguard 
against higher consumer prices – the ultimate concern of the Sherman Act 
and Clayton Acts from which the law provided exemption.  When the bill 
was debated in the House, one of its supporters, Representative Sumners, 
gave this explanation of Section 2: 
The farmers say they do not want an unfair profit.  The farmers want a 
stable price and a fair profit.  They do not want to hold up the Ameri-
can people.  They say, “We are willing to stand up before the Ameri-
can people and defend any price that we ask the American people to 
pay.”244 
 
 241. 62 CONG. REC. 2275 (1922). 
 242. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2227 (1922) (statement of Sen. Phipps) (“[T]he 
intent and purpose of the bill is to provide better marketing facilities for the producers 
of farm products and to reduce the expense of marketing such products without in-
creasing the cost to the ultimate consumer . . . .”); 61 CONG. REC. 1041 (1921) (state-
ment of Rep. Sumners) (“This bill is intended . . . to eliminate much of the economic 
and food waste in distribution, and to divide that economy and to reflect it in greater 
agricultural prosperity and in reduced cost to consumers.”); 60 CONG. REC. 361 
(1920) (statement of Sen. Kellogg) (“[T]he Government can permit, aid, and encour-
age the self-enterprise of the producer and the farmer to establish marketing condi-
tions which will benefit him as well as the consumer, and we should not prevent 
that.”). 
 243. See, e.g., 60 CONG. REC. 373 (1920) (statement of Sen. Walsh) (“. . . far from 
the evils resulting to the public by reason of the organization of associations of this 
character they will contribute very largely to an increase food supply for the people of 
the country.”); 59 CONG. REC. 8022-23 (1920) (statement of Rep. Swope) (“The con-
sumer should also be interested in this proposition, because it would mean that the 
money that in the past has been absorbed in a manner that decreased production 
would under this plan be applied in a way that would rather stimulate production, 
which ultimately means lower prices to the consumers.”). 
 244. 61 CONG. REC. 1042 (1921). 
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The statement was met with applause.245  Representative Sumners con-
tinued, “We must not deny the people the necessary power to do the neces-
sary things for fear they may abuse it.  The thing to do is to give them the 
power, and then give the public a chance, too; and that is what this bill 
does.”246 
The sponsor of the legislation, Representative Volstead, agreed.247  Sec-
tion 2 was necessary “because without that section the bill would be unfair to 
the public, and we ought not to pass anything that would be unfair to the pub-
lic.”248  Representative Volstead concluded that Section 2 – not just Section 1 
– was necessary to “give these organizations a status of equality with other 
business concerns.”249 
In the Senate, the floor leader of the bill, Senator Kellogg, introduced 
Section 2 as a consumer protection measure.  After describing Section 1, 
Senator Kellogg stated: 
Now, I come to the features for the protection of the public in the 
event that any restraint of trade or monopoly unduly enhances prices, 
for, after all, the principal object of the Sherman Act is to prevent 
great organizations of capital and business from getting control of the 
business of the country and enhancing prices to the damage of the 
public.250 
Senator Capper added that Section 2 enhanced consumer welfare by 
“giv[ing] to consumers a protection which they do not now have as against 
middlemen, in that if such farmers’ marketing associations unduly enhance 
prices a complete and adequate remedy is provided in section 2.”251 
When the bill was first introduced in the Sixty-sixth Congress, Senator 
Nelson introduced the bill, saying that its purpose was to allow farmers to 
operate without fear of prosecution under the Sherman Act – but immediately 
added that the bill protected consumers as well.252  “Instead of giving them a 
free hand, as you might say, we provide in the second section that if they go 
to extremes, if they aim to enhance prices unduly or to create a monopoly, 
then the matter can be heard before the Secretary of Agriculture or the Feder-
al Trade Commission . . . .”253  Later in the debate, Senator Kellogg attested 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. 
 248. 61 CONG. REC. 1044 (1921). 
 249. Id. 
 250. 62 CONG. REC. 2049 (1922). 
 251. 62 CONG. REC. 2058 (1922). 
 252. 60 CONG. REC. 314 (1920). 
 253. Id.  The bill as drafted placed the power in the Secretary of Agriculture, 
while a proposed amendment of the Judiciary Committee would have placed the pow-
er in the Federal Trade Commission.  60 CONG. REC. 313 (1920). 
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that Section 2 would provide the same protection to consumers as did the 
Sherman Act.254 
These debates show that the purpose of the Capper-Volstead exemption 
in Section 1 was to raise farm prices and lower consumer prices by making 
market intermediaries unnecessary.  Section 2 was included to ensure that 
consumers would be protected from significant price increases.  Although 
Section 2 has been largely a dead letter,255 the inclusion of consumer protec-
tion provisions still stands to demonstrate that the purpose of the exemption 
in Section 1 is not consistent with supracompetitive price increases by coop-
eratives.  Once a cooperative has formed and succeeded in eliminating the 
mark-up of market intermediaries, no justification exists within the purpose 
of the Act for permitting pre-production supply control agreements that serve 
to further increase farm prices at the expense of the consumer. 
VI.  FEDERAL CONTROL OVER SUPPLY MANAGEMENT IN 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
The history of federal farm policy supports the notion that the purpose 
of the law was not to permit private economic actors to engage in pre-
production supply controls.  Supply management is by no means a foreign 
concept in agricultural law.  Supply control methods, however, have been 
adopted, adapted, and in some cases abandoned at the federal level as part of 
a complex federal strategy to rationalize supply and demand.  Since the New 
Deal, federal farm policy has included a variety of attempts to control supply 
– both pre-production and post-production – in order to stabilize farm in-
comes without creating food scarcity.  The waxing and waning of supply 
control policies have had complex interactions with, and at times negative 
effects on, other priorities of agricultural policy, such as food security and 
natural resource conservation.  This complex balancing of interests has led to 
both ideological and political tension and nearly a century of evolution in 
policy tools used to balance supply and demand.  Because of the complexity 
of supply management, this balancing act has been controlled largely by 
Congress and federal regulators – not devolved to private economic actors.  
To read the Capper-Volstead Act as permitting a broad exemption for output 
restrictions by private economic actors would represent a significant depar-
ture from a century of supply controls managed by government actors. 
The movement toward supply controls began with the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1933.256  During World War I, Congress relied on exports to 
 
 254. 60 CONG. REC. 363 (1920). 
 255. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 256. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (codi-
fied as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-04, 607-20, 623, 624, 627 (2008)). 
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Europe to keep supply in check and prices high.257  When the war ended and 
European production recovered, farmers in the U.S. faced oversupply and 
critically low prices.  The first “Farm Bill” included the concept of the do-
mestic allotment plan, under which the government would effectively offer 
the farmer a price subsidy in return for an agreement to limit output.258  In 
1936, the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler held that the funding 
mechanism of the Agriculture Adjustment Agency (“AAA”) of 1933 usurped 
the powers reserved to the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment.259  
Congress responded in 1938 by passing new farm legislation that removed 
the tax on processors that had failed to pass constitutional muster but other-
wise implemented a broad array of supply controls and income supports.260  
An era of tug-of-war ensued between the Supreme Court’s laissez-faire ap-
proach to economic regulation and Roosevelt’s New Deal vision of govern-
ment intervention to stimulate markets, but the conflict was short-lived.  The 
power of Congress to pass the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 was ul-
timately sustained under the expanding conception of the Commerce 
Clause.261 
A few years later, in Wickard v. Filburn,262 the Supreme Court offered 
judicial insight into the incipient statutory scheme of farm programs.263  In 
Filburn, the Court held that the Secretary of Agriculture had properly imple-
mented the supply control provisions of the 1938 Act when it ordered a wheat 
farmer to destroy a portion of his crop.264  The Court noted that the Act in-
cluded a national acreage allotment for the coming wheat crop; loans and 
payments to wheat farmers in some circumstances; and a farmers’ referendum 
 
 257. See Devan A. McGranahan et al., A Historical Primer on the US Farm Bill: 
Supply Management and Conservation Policy, 68 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 
67A, 67A (2013). 
 258. SCHLESINGER, supra note 200, at 36. 
 259. 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936).  
 260. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-82, 1291-92, 1301, 1303-04, 1321, 1326, 
1329a, 1331-34, 1334b, 1335-36, 1338-39, 1341-42a, 1343-44, 1344b, 1345-46, 
1348-50, 1357, 1359aa-59ll, 1361-68, 1371-79, 1379a-79j, 1383, 1385-93, 1501-18, 
1520, 1521; 15 U.S.C. § 713c-1 (2012)). 
 261. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1939) (upholding the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938). 
 262. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 263. The case is, of course, better known for its broad statement of the scope of 
federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 128.  The Supreme Court has 
referred to Filburn as “perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause 
authority over intrastate activity.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).  
The Court has generally declined to extend the Commerce Clause holding of Filburn.  
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587-88 (2012); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61. 
 264. 317 U.S. at 130-31.  Filburn was allotted 11.1 acres of wheat with a normal 
yield of 20.1 bushels per acre.  Filburn planted 23 acres and harvested 239 bushels of 
wheat from the excess 11.9 acres.  Id. at 114-15. 
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on a compulsory national marketing quota when supply was expected to ex-
ceed domestic consumption and export.265  Thus, the Act and its amendments 
included pre-production allotments, price supports, and post-production quo-
tas, with mechanisms for public participation by farmers.  The Court ex-
plained: 
The wheat industry has been a problem industry for some years.  
Largely as a result of increased foreign production and import re-
strictions, annual exports of wheat and flour from the United States 
during the ten-year period ending in 1940 averaged less than 10 per-
cent of total production, while, during the 1920’s, they averaged more 
than 25 per cent. . . . The four large exporting countries of Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, and the United States have all undertaken various 
programs for the relief of growers.  Such measures have been de-
signed in part at least to protect the domestic price received by pro-
ducers.  Such plans have generally evolved toward control by the cen-
tral government.266 
Throughout the history of agricultural supply management policy, the 
federal government has had to balance the goal of higher U.S. farm incomes 
against other goals.  The federal government must balance the goal of raising 
farm incomes through supply management against the goal of producing ade-
quate and affordable food for the nation’s consumers.  In the 1933 Farm Bill, 
the “Ever-Normal Granary” plan of Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace 
balanced nonrecourse loans, marketing quotas, deficiency payments to pro-
ducers, and crop insurance to ensure food security for consumers as well as 
income security for producers.267  In the 1960s, the Kennedy Administration 
initiated the Food Stamp Plan as part of a program to stimulate demand and 
reduce surpluses.268 
In recent decades, political support for production controls has waned, 
and the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act provided 
income supports unrelated to production decisions and eliminated acreage 
allotments tied to price supports and land set-asides.269  However, policies 
that have the effect of limiting production have been advanced primarily to 
serve resource conservation goals.270  These conservation programs, which 
 
 265. Id. at 115-16. 
 266. Id. at 125-26 (emphasis added). 
 267. COCHRANE & RUNGE, supra note 190, at 41-42; see also McGranahan, supra 
note 257, at 68A-69A. 
 268. COCHRANE & RUNGE, supra note 190, at 46.  The two other prongs of the 
tripartite plan were providing food aid to poor nations and expanding commercial 
exports.  Id. at 46-47. 
 269. BILL WINDERS, THE POLITICS OF FOOD SUPPLY: U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 161 (2009). 
 270. These programs extend back to 1934, following the first of the Dust Bowl 
years, when the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1935 added the 
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may also have the effect of removing land from production, have overlapped 
over the years with programs to reduce production.  Because land retirement 
programs come at a cost to taxpayers, however, farm conservation programs 
have sought to employ government oversight to ensure that maximum public 
benefits are achieved.  In land retirement programs, the federal government 
pays landowners to retire land from production, effectively “renting” the land 
in exchange for environmental benefits.  The programs return value to tax-
payers only if farmers set aside resource-sensitive lands or lands that offer 
significant ecosystem benefits.  This may or may not significantly lower pro-
duction, depending on the productivity of the land prior to retirement. 
Currently, under the Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”),271 
USDA’s Farm Service Agency (“FSA”) contracts with farmers to remove 
environmentally-sensitive land from production and to devote that land to use 
for conservation benefits.272  In exchange for rental payments, participants in 
the CRP program establish long-term, resource-conserving plant species to 
control erosion, improve water quality, and develop wildlife habitat.273  Simi-
larly, under the new Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (“ACEP”), 
USDA’s Natural Resources Conservation Service (“NRCS”) provides tech-
nical and financial assistance through conservation easements to restore wet-
lands that are currently farmed or have been converted for farming.274  In both 
 
Soil Conservation Service, now known as the Natural Resources Conservation Ser-
vice, to the USDA.  See DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN 
THE 1930S, at 28-29 (1979); McGranahan, supra note 257.  The Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1936, an emergency effort to work around the Butler ruling, paid farmers 
to switch from “soil-depleting” row crops to “soil-conserving” legumes and grasses, 
with the effect of taking acreage out of commodity crop production.  COCHRANE & 
RUNGE, supra note 190, at 41-42.  After the supply shortages and high prices of the 
1940s, farm policy in the 1950s again faced a surplus problem.  Id. at 45.  This led to 
the creation of two new programs tied to conservation in the Agricultural Act of 1956: 
the Acreage Reduction Program (“ARP”), in which acreage was set aside and could 
not be harvested or pastured; and the first iteration of the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram (“CRP”), which encouraged farmers to shift less productive land to long-term 
conservation uses.  Id.  The ARP and early CRP fell into disuse after 1959, largely 
because they failed to reduce farm output.  Id.  In response, the Secretary of Agricul-
ture tried to reduce production by lowering loan levels, a strategy that also failed.  Id. 
at 45-46. 
 271. See Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014).  Average 
acreage enrolled in CRP from 1986-2013 was nearly 30.9 million, with average rental 
payment outlays of over $1.5 billion per year.  See Farm Service Agency, USDA, 
CRP Enrollments and Rental Payments by State, 1986-2013, available at http://www.
fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=copr&topic=crp-st. 
 272. See FARM SERVICE AGENCY, USDA, CONSERVATION FACT SHEET 1 (2014), 
available at http://fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/crp_general_fs.pdf. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 2301, 128 Stat. 649 (2014); 
see also Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, USDA NATURAL RESOURCES 
CONSERVATION SERVICES, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/
programs/easements/acep/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
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cases, however, funds are limited and enrollment priority is based on criteria 
established and administered by USDA.275  In the case of CRP, for example, 
offers for CRP contracts are ranked based on an Environmental Benefits In-
dex.276  Under ACEP, NRCS prioritizes applications by evaluating the pro-
posed easement’s potential to protect and enhance habitat for migratory birds 
and other wildlife.277 
The Wetlands Conservation Program and Highly Erodible Lands Pro-
gram278 also reduce production to some extent to achieve environmental 
gains.279  Under these programs, FSA denies crop insurance eligibility to pro-
ducers who have converted wetlands to cropland or who have planted in 
highly erodible lands without an approved soil conservation plan.280  In con-
trast with CRP and ACEP, which provide financial incentives, these conser-
vation compliance programs provide financial disincentives to bring envi-
ronmentally-sensitive land into production.281  Like CRP and ACEP, howev-
er, the production-limiting effects of conservation compliance are inherently 
dependent on federal administration, since indeed the programs only operate 
by denying producers financial support that they would otherwise receive 
under federal crop insurance programs. 
Private economic actors do participate in pre-production supply controls 
through the Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act (“AMAA”) of 1937, but 
only under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Agriculture.282  The 
AMAA allows the Secretary or “any other person”283 to propose a marketing 
agreement to control the quantity of fruits, vegetables, nuts, and milk pro-
duced with respect to any agricultural commodity.284  Marketing agreements 
are voluntary agreements between the Secretary and producers,285 but the 
Secretary may authorize an agreement only when he or she has reason to be-
lieve that average farm prices for the agricultural commodity are below fair 
exchange value,286 and that a marketing agreement may help to stabilize pric-
 
 275. Id. 
 276. See FARM SERVICE AGENCY, supra note 272.  EBI factors for ranking con-
tract offers include “[w]ildlife habitat benefits resulting from covers on contract acre-
age; [w]ater quality benefits from reduced erosion, runoff and leaching; [o]n-farm 
benefits from reduced erosion; [b]enefits that will likely endure beyond the contract 
period; [a]ir quality benefits from reduced wind erosion, and; [c]ost.”  Id. 
 277. See Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, supra note 274. 
 278. Agricultural Act of 2014 § 2611. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 191, at 164-65. 
 281. See Agricultural Act of 2014 § 2611. 
 282. See Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-74 
(2012). 
 283. 7 C.F.R. § 900.3(a) (2014). 
 284. See 7 U.S.C. § 608b(a)  (2012). 
 285. 7 U.S.C. § 608(2) (2012). 
 286. § 608(1)(a). 
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es and contribute to orderly marketing of the commodity.287  After a public 
hearing, a finding by the Secretary, and execution of the agreement by 
enough parties to effectuate its purpose,288 the agreement may enter into 
force. 289  Marketing agreements are expressly exempted from the antitrust 
laws,290 but only if the Secretary is an actual party to the agreements.291  
Marketing orders, another supply control measure authorized by the AMAA, 
are created solely at the direction of the Secretary and are binding upon all 
producers if accompanied by a marketing agreement and if the order is ap-
proved by two-thirds of relevant producers.292  The AMAA exempts output-
limitation agreements from the antitrust laws only with substantial federal 
oversight and numerous procedural safeguards.293  As the Supreme Court has 
stated, the “obvious intention” of the power given to the Secretary by the 
AMAA is to provide a moderating function, authorizing only “what may be 
found to be reasonable arrangements in particular instances and in the light of 
the circumstances disclosed.”294 
This overview of U.S. agricultural supply management policy holds two 
lessons for interpretation of the Capper-Volstead exemption.  First, supply 
management has existed throughout the history of U.S. farm policy and has 
involved a balancing of various factors, including provision of hunger relief 
and controlling consumer food prices; need for acreage set aside in conserva-
tion programs; and conservation compliance as an incentive to receive other 
federal farm program benefits.  The complexity of this interplay of forces has 
required frequent adjustment and redirection of supply control policy at the 
federal level.  Legislators and regulators, who are accountable to the public 
for the balance struck among these priorities, are in a different position than 
private agricultural cooperatives to implement supply controls. 
Second, since policymakers were developing supply control mecha-
nisms for federal farm policy by the early 1930s, it is unlikely that such 
mechanisms were outside the imagination of members of Congress who de-
bated the Capper-Volstead Act a decade earlier.  More likely, the omission of 
discussion of pre-production supply controls in the Act suggests that Con-
gress was focused on a different purpose in crafting the exemption.  That 
purpose is illustrated by repeated comments that the Act was intended to 
eliminate the middleman in marketing agricultural products, raising profits 
for farmers without raising prices to consumers.  The allowance of some post-
 
 287. § 608(1)(b). 
 288. 7 C.F.R. § 900.14(a) (2014). 
 289. Id. 
 290. 7 U.S.C. § 608b(a) (2012). 
 291. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 200-01 (1939); see also 1 
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & JAMES BRYCE WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 
10.3 (1982). 
 292. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(8)(A) (2012). 
 293. See Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-74 
(2012). 
 294. Borden Co., 308 U.S. at 199. 
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production supply controls, as the courts have stated, is necessary to any co-
operative marketing arrangement and thus is an inevitable extension of the 
exemption provided by Section 1 of Capper-Volstead.  Once such a market-
ing strategy is in place and has succeeded in eliminating monopsony power of 
intermediaries, however, little justification exists for extending the exemption 
to pre-production supply controls that would raise prices to consumers and 
involve private economic actors in a complex balancing act between policy 
goals at the federal level. 
CONCLUSION 
The phrase “processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing” 
in the Capper-Volstead Act does not appear to include output-limiting agree-
ments, particularly when the ordinary meaning of the term is read in conjunc-
tion with the rest of the statute and in light of the rule in favor of interpreting 
antitrust exemptions narrowly.  The legislative history shows that Congress 
did not debate pre-production supply controls, and indirect statements of in-
tent do not provide sufficient evidence to overcome the conclusion based on a 
textualist reading of the Act.  The purpose of the statute, as repeatedly stated 
in the debates, was to raise farmers’ profits by eliminating monopsony power 
of intermediaries without raising prices to consumers.295  Members of Con-
gress emphasized that the exemption was intended to increase, not decrease, 
production, and they included Section 2 of the Act to provide a safeguard 
against higher consumer prices.296 
If the Capper-Volstead exemption is unavailable, the implications for 
cooperatives are real, but need not be devastating.  First, some cooperatives, 
like those in the Potatoes and Mushrooms cases, already fail to qualify for 
Capper-Volstead protection because of violation of the Act’s other require-
ments.  Second, associations that engage in output-limiting agreements may 
be able to defend those practices against Sherman Act claims by arguing that 
courts should apply the rule of reason to claims of agricultural supply con-
trols and by showing a pro-competitive justification for the practices.  Coop-
eratives would not be entitled, however, to dismiss such claims based on the 
Capper-Volstead exemption.  Finally, agricultural cooperatives still have at 
their disposal a wide array of business practices at the post-production stage 
that courts have held they may legitimately rely upon to stabilize prices and 
control supply. 
If the exemption is unavailable, consumers will be able to use the anti-
trust laws to prosecute claims for substantial price hikes arising from output 
limitations.  As long as the Secretary of Agriculture declines to use his au-
thority under Section 2 of Capper-Volstead to monitor undue price enhance-
ment, the consumer protection goals of Section 2 may be better effectuated by 
private plaintiffs.  Price increases of the magnitude alleged by plaintiffs in the 
 
 295. See supra Part IV. 
 296. See supra Part IV.B. 
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pending cases – as much as forty percent during the period of the output-
limitation agreement – would otherwise avoid scrutiny.  Plaintiffs would still 
be required to prove that defendants’ conduct was illegal under the antitrust 
laws. 
Congress did give agriculture certain exemptions because of inherent 
difficulties endemic to agricultural markets, but those exemptions extend only 
as far as Congress intended.  Output limitations – however effective in con-
trolling supply and fixing prices – do not appear to be among the tools that 
Congress intended to exempt in passing the Capper-Volstead Act. 
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